Beef Packer Conduct, Alternative Approaches to Price Discovery, and Success Factors for New Generation Cooperatives by Carlberg, Jared Garfield
BEEF PACKER CONDUCT, ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES TO PRICE DISCOVERY, 




JARED GARFIELD CARLBERG 
Bachelor of Arts (Honours) 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
1997 
Bachelor of Commerce 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
1997 
Master of Science 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
1999 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
August, 2002 
BEEF PACKER CONDUCT, ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES TO PRICE DISCOVERY, 







This dissertation is organized into three main chapters. The first, "Industry 
Conduct and Supergame Strategies in a Dynamic Oligopsony", uses concepts from game 
theory to determine the patterns of behavior in an experimental market for fed cattle, 
designed to closely resemble its real world counterpart. Evidence of collusive behavior 
in fed cattle procurement is discovered, and it is concluded that further investigation 
employing real market data is warranted. To this point, regulators are unwilling to reveal 
that data to researchers. It is hoped that the evidence discovered here will help convince 
them that this data should be shared. 
The second chapter is entitled "Alternative Approaches to Livestock Price 
Discovery: Theory and Empirical Estimates." It proposes two separate theoretical 
frameworks for estimation of livestock price discovery models, and tests the models 
empirically using data from the experimental fed cattle.market. It is found that 
alternative theoretical bases and model structures yield different estimates of the impacts 
of some key variables. As such, it is argued that researchers should base choice of model 
on predetermined goals, but that alternative methods should be considered. 
The third and final chapter of the dissertation is entitled "Success Factors for 
Value-Added New Generation Cooperatives." It details the results of a survey of fifty 
New Generation Cooperatives managers regarding the factors most important to their 
success, and discusses the differences among responses from NGCs operating in various 
industries. It is found that the factors most important to the success ofNGCs depend on 
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the industry in which they operate, but that overall, the planning stage is critically 
important to these enterprises, as is control of cost factors. It is hoped that results of the 
survey can be used by managers of existing and new NGCs to enhance their chances of 
long-term sustainability. 
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you, Dr. Tilley, for everything you have taught me, and for the time you have taken to 
advise me in my research. 
Dr. Rodney B. Holcomb also served on my graduate committee and provided 
outstanding assistance, particularly on the third chapter. His knowledge of agribusiness 
topics was invaluable in shaping that work. Thank you, Rodney, for your help and for 
your always positive outlook. It has truly been a pleasure to work with you, and I look 
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I. Industry Conduct and Supergame Strategies in a Dynamic Oligopsony 
Introduction 
Perceived anti-competitive behavior of beef packers is an ongoing cause of 
concern for those stakeholders in the earlier stages of the beef supply chain. Cattle 
producers and feeders have long argued that large packing firms take advantage of 
limited competition in their industry to earn excessive profit. With the national four-firm 
concentration ratio exceeding 80% (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration), and being even higher in some procurement regions, these allegations of 
market power abuse do not seem completely unfounded. Nevertheless, as Ward (2002) 
notes, there has been little attempt on the part of regulators and no rewards to the efforts 
of litigators to rectify this situation. Part of the reason for this is that the conduct of 
individual firms is difficult to discover, given data limitations. Often, only market prices 
and quantities are observable. These data do not suffice for studying individual firm 
behavior. 
Concerns about packer concentration date to the tum of the 20th century when the 
"Big 5" of that era (Armour, Cudahy, Morris, Swift, and Wilson) controlled a large share 
of the industry (Azzam and Anderson). Regulatory intervention, combined with 
technological advances that lowered barriers to entry, effectively decreased concentration 
levels. These lower levels prevailed until the 1970s and 1980s, when a series of 
acquisitions and mergers created the new "Big 3": IBP, ConAgra, and Excel. As 
concentration in the industry continues to increase, so do attempts to measure the effects 
of thereof on industry stakeholders, and by a variety of methods. 
Many early studies of market power in beef packing employed the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. These studies, based on the application ofBain's 
ideas (and Mason's and Chamberlin's before that), attempt to relate levels of 
concentration in an industry to firm profitability or price levels. According to the SCP 
paradigm, the "structure" of an industry, which is defined by the number of firms, affects 
how firms may "conduct" themselves, as measured by their ability to move away from 
the competitive price. In turn, the industry's "performance", which may be described in 
terms of prices ( or a number of other measures) compared to those that would prevail 
under perfect competition, will depend on the conduct of firms. A thorough review of 
studies that have applied the SCP paradigm to the beef industry can be found in Azzaro 
and Anderson. 
The SCP approach has fallen somewhat out of favor due to its theoretical 
shortcomings. Variable measurement problems, concerns about direction of causality 
between prices/profitability and concentration, poorly specified (ad-hoc) models, and 
uncertainty about the nature of pricing conduct in SCP studies have all been cited as 
reasons for this. In its place has arisen the New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(NEIO) approach, in which firm behavior is more explicitly developed. Most NEIO 
research involves the estimation of a "conjectural variation", the estimated value of 
which is then linked to a specific type of firm conduct. This approach was first used to 
model the beef packing industry by Schroeter, and is now the one most often taken in 
studies of packer conduct. NEIO has been extended to·include concepts from game 
theory by Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson and Koontz and Garcia. This allows the repeated 
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strategic interaction of packers to be modeled more fully, and provides a theoretical basis 
for much observed behavior. 
The objective of the research reported in this paper is to develop and estimate a 
game theoretic model of industry conduct and supergame strategies in a dynamic 
oligopsony. Data from an experimental fed cattle market, designed to resemble a real 
market procurement region, are used. Though a few previous attempts have been made 
to apply concepts from game theory to agricultural markets, these studies have been 
limited by their use of aggregated data and lack of firm cost data. Additionally, little 
effort has been made to model individual firm behavior, because individual transaction 
data have not been available. This research is therefore unique in that firm level price 
and cost data allow a more complete analysis of industry conduct and underlying firm 
strategies to be undertaken. As well, the use of game theory, which explicitly considers 
strategic interactions among packers, is an improvement over most conventional methods 
used to study the behavior of those firms. 
Theory 
Friedman's ( 1971) specification can be adapted to packer behavior in a fed cattle 
region. We begin with the single period, non-cooperative ordinary procurement game 
played by a fixed, finite set of packers N = (1, 2, ... , n) in a given region. 1 A game is 
non-cooperative if players are forbidden from making binding agreements; this is the case 
for the procurement game in the United States because of antitrust legislation. The 
information structure of the game is assumed to be one of complete but imperfect 
information. Complete information implies that each player is aware of the strategy sets 
and payoff functions that apply to all participants, and imperfect information means that 
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players are not completely able to observe the strategic decisions made by others. For 
instance, each packer is not aware of the exact prices paid or quantities purchased by all 
other packers for each trading period. They are merely aware of the prevailing market 
price and quantity. 
Quantity of fed cattle purchased is the strategic variable in the procurement game. 
Each player chooses a (quantity) strategy Si from the available set of strategies Si, a 
compact, convex subset of Euclidean space of finite dimension. The strategy set of the 
overall game, S, which consists of all possible quantities procured for all packers in a 
single period, is the Cartesian product of the individual Si strategy sets: 
(1) S = S1 X S2 X ... X Sn, 
The vector of strategies chosen in the single period ordinary game is then 
(2) s = (s1, S2, ... , Sn), 
where each Si denotes a procurement volume chosen by packer i e N. The payoff to the 
ith player, in this case the profit from processing fed cattle into boxed beef, is a function 
of its own strategy as well as the strategies of all other players and is denoted 1ti( s ). It is 
clear that the volume of cattle procured by each packer affects the volume available to the 
remaining packers, which in tum affects their payoff. As such, the vector of industry 
payoffs associated with strategy vector s can be written as 
(3) 1t(s) = (1t1(s), 1t2(s), ... , 7tn(s)). 
An equilibrium point of the ordinary game is a strategy vector se which satisfies 
the condition 
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for alls E Sand all i EN. That is, an equilibrium point exists where each packer 
maximizes its payoff with respect to its own choice of strategy, given the strategy choices 
of other players in the game. This equilibrium point is often called the Nash equilibrium 
of the game. 
Friedman (1971) notes that when the payoff functions are profit functions, the 
players are firms, and the strategy choices are quantities ( or prices), the game is a single 
period oligopoly and the non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium is the same as the Coumot 
solution.2 Packers in a single period game would then choose this quantity to achieve 
static profit maximization. This strategy may not hold for a repeated game, however, in 
which the same ordinary game is played at each iteration (Friedman, 1986). If players 
are able to tacitly collude in a multiperiod game, they may be able to achieve profits in 
excess of those which would be generated in a single period game. It is well-established 
that the Nash equilibrium of a single period game can differ substantially from that which 
will prevail in a repeated game, because alternate strategies can produce higher payoffs 
than in the single period game. An infinitely repeated game will not necessarily be 
repeated for an infinite period of time, but a game may be correctly termed infinite if the 
players cannot conceive of a definite ending point, and thus do not choose strategies with 
such a definite ending period in mind.3 
A sequence of ordinary games with individual player strategy sets Sil, Si2, ••• , 
Sit,··· and attached payoff functions n:i1(s1) is a supergame in extensive form, with the t1h 
move in the game being the playing of the t1h ordinary game in the infinite sequence. 
This formulation allows for the association of strategies and payoffs across time. The 
strategy set for the tth ordinary constituent game of the supergame is then 
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( 5) St = S It X S2t X ••• X Snt, 
where the strategy sets may now differ across time, and the associated payoff vector is 
In the supergame, players do not seek to maximize their single period payoffs, but 
rather their payoffs over time. Given a discount parameter for the ith player in the tth time 
period of bit = 1 / ( 1 +<lit) where <lit > 0 is the discount rate, the payoff to player i at the 
outset of the supergame is 
00 
(7) ni = I: bit 1tit{St)• 
t=l 
Since all players' past strategies form part of the information set available to each player, 
supergame strategies take the form 
(8) Sit= git(S1, S2, ... , St-1), 
which says that the strategy chosen by player i in the current period is some mapping of 
the strategy vectors of all players in all previous periods.4 In the beef packing industry, 
past fed cattle purchase prices and volumes of rivals are taken into account when setting 
quantity in the current procurement period. Further, static profit maximization is not 
necessarily the packers' goal, as found by Driscoll, Kamphampaty, and Purcell. Rather, 
packers seek to maximize a discounted profit stream. 
The concept of a trigger strategy equilibrium (Friedman 1986) is central to the 
idea that beef packers can tacitly collude to keep fed cattle prices from approaching those 
that would prevail in a competitive market. Trigger strategy equilibria facilitate 
cooperation between players that allows them to achieve cooperative ( cartel) outcomes in 
games that have a noncooperative structure. A trigger strategy is a tacit agreement to 
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choose in each period a strategy vector s* = (s1 *, s2*, ... , Sn*) which results in lower fed 
cattle prices than those which would come about in the ordinary game. The strategy 
vector in an ordinary game would see each player choosing a Cournot strategy sc = (s1 C, 
s2 C, •.. , Sn c). It is important to note that 
00 00 
(9) L <>it 1tit(s*t) > L <>it 7tit(Sct) 
t=l t=l 
for all i e N, otherwise a trigger strategy would not be chosen. Such a strategy would not 
be a noncooperative equilibrium in a single period game, because it would not be the 
single period profit maximizing strategy of any player. 
Any player can increase its single period payoff for any iteration within the 
supergame by choosing a defection strategy Sid. In the beef packing procurement game, 
such a strategy would see player i pay slightly higher than the collusive price for fed 
cattle, thus increasing its processing volume, and earning payoff 7tit(Sid) > 7tit(Si*). If any 
player defects from the tacitly collusive strategy vectors* by choosing Sid, it ''triggers" a 
reversionary (noncooperative) episode in which the other players, who observe that 
market prices have risen above some trigger level, must follow suit, and all players will 
choose Sjc G-::/:- i) for each remaining time period. This is often referred to as a punishment 
period for the game, so named because defection by one player results in punishment of 
that player (and all others, if that player cannot be singled out) for some period of time. 
But because (9) holds for all players across each ordinary constituent game of the 




(10) I: Di11tit(s*1) > 7tH(sid)+ I: Dit7ti1(s\), 
t='t t='t+l 
where 't is the period in which defection occurs. If (10) holds, there is no benefit to 
defection during any iteration of the supergame. 
It is clear that defections would never occur in such a scenario, if players are 
rational profit maximizing firms. Nevertheless, most markets-including the fed cattle 
market-exhibit patterns that are consistent with periodic reversionary episodes. The 
Green and Porter model can be used to show why such episodes can occur in the fed 
cattle market due to cattle supply fluctuations not directly observed by firms, rather than 
due to defection of any of the cartel members. 5 They assert that the punishment period 
does not necessarily last for the remainder of the game after defection, but rather is T 
ordinary game periods in length. They further suggest that T may depend, among other 
possibilities, upon the amount by which the trigger price and market price differ in the 
first reversionary period. 
Denote the observable market price as p and the trigger price, which suggests that 
one or more players has defected and chosen s/, as pd. The fed cattle market then enters 
a reversionary period when p > pd. Packer i's expected aggregate procurement volume 
for all other packers i ct:- j in normal periods is defined as 
N 
(ll)Qi= I: s/ 
jct:-i 
Suppose that in normal periods, packer i follows some strategy Sih, which may or may not 
be the same as si*. The expected payoff to choosing Sih is 
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where cp is a vector of i.i.d. random unobservable supply shocks with cumulative 
n 
distribution function F and probability density function f such that Pt = cp L Sit· Each 
packer's expected payoff in reversionary periods is then 
(13) E[1ti{Sic)] = Eq,7ti[Si\cpp[ L s/]], 
j-5:n 
i=l 
and it is assumed that E[1ti{sih)] > E[7ti(Sic)] for all i. Then Ili from (7) satisfies 
where Pr(·) represents probability with respect to the distribution of cp. Since (Pr(cpp(sih + 
which in turn equals 
+ 
Thus, the expected discounted value of packer i equals what it would be in a single period 
Cournot environment, plus the discounted gain in returns due to participation in the 
cartel. Then the Nash equilibrium (4), stated as a trigger strategy equilibrium Si* and 
incorporated into (7) can be rewritten as 
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for all Sih and i. This means that no strategy can produce a higher payoff for players than 
the trigger strategy. The associated first order condition for (17) is 
(18) Ili'(s/) = 0 
for all players i. From the quotient rule, (a/ b )' = 0 if and only if a'b - ab' = 0, so (18) is 
the same as 
(19) 0 = [1 - bi+ (8i - 8?) F(pd / p( I s/))] E[Ili(s/)]' + (8i - biT) f ((pd Ip( I sj*)) 
j5,n j5,n 
x [pdp'( I sj*)/ (p( I sj* ))2)] x (E[Ili(s/)] - E[1ti(sic)]), 
j5,n j5,n 
which says that the marginal return to defecting from collusive output levels must be 
exactly offset by the risk of suffering a loss in returns by triggering a reversionary 
episode of length T. 
An implication of this result is that the observed market price reveals information 
about supply only, and does not cause players to revise their interpretations of what their 
competitors have procured. The frequency of industry reversion from collusive states 
will be given by F(pd / p( I sj*)), and these reversions occur regardless of actual 
j5,n 
intentional defections by cartel members. The critical extension of this result is that even 
though participants are aware reversionary episodes occur as a result of supply conditions 
rather than intentional defections, it is rational for them to participate in the episodes 
anyway. As Green and Porter note, such episodes are temporary switches to a Nash 
equilibrium in noncontingent strategies, specifically the single period Cournot 
procurement levels. Further, no firm can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing its 
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strategy once a reversionary episode has begun. If firms did not participate in the 
reversionary episodes when high prices prevailed due to low fed cattle supply conditions, 
the first order condition (18) would not hold during normal game periods, and collusive 
behavior would not be individually optimal for packers. 
It can therefore be seen how the beef packing industry can be expected to exhibit 
both reversionary and collusive periods. Reversionary periods may be caused by either 
fluctuations in the supply of fed cattle, which cause high prices that appear as defections, 
or actual choice of a defection strategy by any of the packing firms. If plant shutdown 
costs are sufficiently high, firms may purposely choose Sid as their optimal strategy. If 
fed cattle supply is particularly low, players will understand this and punishment period 
length T will be very short. Allowing for such defections under certain circumstances 
does not change the theoretical basis of the procurement game in any important way. 
Data 
Plant-level fed cattle procurement data are not available for the real fed cattle 
market. Although such data are collected by the Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), they are protected for proprietary reasons and hence 
not available to researchers except in unique cases. For this and other reasons, the Fed 
Cattle Market Simulator (FCMS) was developed at Oklahoma State University (OSU) to 
function as an experimental market for fed cattle. The FCMS closely resembles a real 
market fed cattle procurement region, in which there are typically several cattle feeders 
and not more than a few fed cattle purchasers (Ward et al. 1996). The FCMS has been 
used extensively for teaching, extension, and research experiments. Ward et al. (2001) 
provide a history of these experiments and other applications of the experimental market. 
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A detailed explanation of the experimental market can be found in Ward et al. (1996). 
Thus, only the fundamentals are presented here. 
In the experimental market, four beef packing firms of different sizes and eight 
feedlots trade paper pens of one hundred head of fed cattle in open negotiation trading 
sessions that last approximately seven minutes. Players may participate in cash or 
forward transactions, and may also hedge or speculate in the futures market. Packing 
firms are aware of their efficient (minimum cost) procurement volumes, which are 8, 9, 
11, and 12 pens per trading period for packers 1 through 4, respectively. Average total 
processing cost curves for the four packers are shown in Figure 1. Output (boxed beef) 
price is determined by the volume of fed cattle processed, i.e. number of pens and 
weights of cattle. Packing firms use the most recent boxed beef price to determine their 
bids in order to maintain certain margins. Cattle feeders are also aware of their minimum 
breakeven weights and usually prefer to sell their cattle at 1150 pounds. Cattle are placed 
on the showlist at 1100 pounds and gain 25 pounds per week until they are sold. 6 The 
number of new placements on the showlist follows a cyclical pattern, similar to that 
found in the continuously adjusting real market. At certain times, supplies are plentiful 
and each packer can reach its minimum cost volume relatively easily, with little 
competition with the other packers over price. At other times, however, fed cattle stocks 
can be quite tight, and packers are forced to bid up fed cattle prices in an effort to reach 
their minimum cost volumes. 
Several types of information are provided to the players during and following 
each trading session, and end of week summary information is provided to the market 
after each trading period closes. Details for the most recent transactions are continuously 
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scrolled across an electronic information display during and between the trading periods. 
Financial statements are provided to each packer and feedlot in the short interval between 
sessions, and the players then have a limited amount of time to calculate new bid/ask 
prices. Players are also informed periodically of which packing firm and which feedlot 
are most and least financially successful. This may influence other firms in their dealings 
with the "winners" or "losers". 
Data used in this paper were generated during in-class use of the FCMS during 
the spring semesters of 1994, 1995, and 1996. Summary statistics for the three years' 
data are presented in Table 1. Participants were undergraduate ·agriculture majors at 
OSU. The first year's data consist of 2,664 observations collected over 72 trading 
periods. In 1995, 3,450 observations were collected over 92 sessions. An experiment 
carried out that year saw a marketing agreement imposed between the largest beef packer 
and two specific feedlots for a portion of the semester. Such a marketing agreement 
might be expected to decrease the level of collusion in the industry, since it would 
decrease the bargaining power possessed by the largest fed cattle buyer. The 1996 
semester, which had 60 trading sessions with 2,197 observations, also involved a 
classroom experiment. In that year, public information available to the participants was 
limited for intermittent periods of time. The electronic displays which provide current 
cash market and futures market information were disconnected, leaving firms unable to 
base bid/ask price decisions on market data. Expected results of this information 
constraint upon industry performance are uncertain: it is often argued that providing extra 
information to members of a cartel allows them to coordinate their pricing (i.e. trigger 
strategy) behavior more easily, resulting in more collusive conduct. On the other hand, 
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current market information on boxed beef prices may strengthen the bargaining position 
of feedlots if they know what packers can afford to pay. 
For each of the three years, missing observations are encountered in the data sets 
used to estimate firms' reaction functions. At times, beef packing firms who encounter 
particularly tight supply conditions are unable to procure fed cattle at a price they are 
willing to pay, and so a single period plant shutdown occurs. During such a shutdown, 
no cattle are procured, processed, or sold, but the firm still has fixed costs and as a result 
an operating loss is incurred. Rather than omitting the entire trading session as an 
observation, the firm's procurement price and volume are calculated as the average of the 
values for the previous and next period. The losses in precision of doing are not believed 
to be serious. For the 1994 data, 4.86% of the observations are averaged in this way, for 
1995 the number is 2.72%, and for 1996 it is 7.08%. 
Procedure 
Beef packing at the industry level is examined first in an attempt to discover 
evidence that firms tacitly collude when procuring fed cattle. The methodology uses firm 
processing margins similar to the work of Richards, Patterson, and Acharya, and 
Schroeter and Azzam. Recall that the ordinary constituent game of the supergame is one 
where profit maximization is the objective function for packer i. As such, the packer's 
problem can be written 
(20) max 7ti = pqi -w(X,z)xi - c(qi), 
where p is the price of boxed beef sold in the wholesale market, qi is the quantity of 
boxed beef sold, w(X,z) is the price of fed cattle, X is the total quantity of fed cattle 
available for sale, z is a vector of supply shifting exogenous variables, and c( qi) is the ith 
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firm's cost as a function of the quantity of cattle processed. The input transformation 
function of the ith firm, which describes how fed cattle are processed into boxed beef, is 
(21) qi = Y Xi , 
where y is the dressing percentage. Incorporating the input transformation function (21 ), 
the firm's objective function (20) can be restated as 
(22) max 7ti = pyxi - w(X,z)xi - c(yxi), 
and then the first order condition for profit maximization is 
(23) &ti/ 8xi = y(p-Cqi) - wi(X,z)- [(8wi I BX) x (BX I axi )] = 0, 
where Cqi is the marginal cost of firm i. 
The conjectural variation of a firm describes its response to changes in output by 
N 
other firms, and is denoted~= Z:: dxi / dxj- The industry conduct parameter, which 
i"# j 
includes the conjectural variation, can be written as 
(24) e = 1 + ~. 
and it is constrained to take on a value between O and 2.7 Since conduct at the industry 
level is the variable of interest for the time being, it is the industry average conjecture that 
is contained in e. The processing margin for packer i is given as 
(25) mi = (py - wi(X,z)), 
which merely states that the processing margin is the difference between the marginal 
value product and the fed cattle price. 
The supply function for fed cattle provided to packers by feedlots is 
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N 
where Qt = I qit is the total quantity of fed cattle purchased in period t, Zj is the cost 
i=l 
of gain, Lt is the average weight of cattle sold in period t, and et is the disturbance term. 
As in Schroeter and Azzam, the proportion of marketings to available supply is used as 
the dependent variable because it is a more precise measure of supply response than 
marketings alone. Average weight of cattle procured in time period t can be specified as 
(27) Lt = TJo + TJ 1Xt 
where TJ 1 is expected to have a positive sign. As the quantity of fed cattle available for 
sale increases, the average Weight of cattle sold should increase as well. This is because 
packers prefer to purchase heavier cattle, whereas feedlots prefer to sell cattle at 1150 
pounds.8 
Given the supply function (26), (25) can be rewritten as an industry average 
margm 
where a.-1 is the inverse slope of the supply function, and mt is the average margin earned 
in period t and is the same as in (25), except that the industry average procurement price 
is used for w(X,z). Similarly, Cqt is the marginal cost for the industry as a whole, 
calculated as 
t_ N i 
(29) Cq - L OljCq , 
i=l 
where roi is firm i's share of procurement and Cqi is firm i's marginal cost at the industry's 
minimum cost volume.9 
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The three equation system (26) - (28) is estimated simultaneously for each data 
set using the MODEL procedure in SAS. Only (26) and (28) are fit in the estimation; 
(27) is modeled but not fit because its purpose is merely to ensure that the average weight 
variable is considered endogenous in the estimation procedure. The estimation method is 
nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS), with market price specified as an endogenous 
variable in the system. Equations (26) and (27) are estimated in log-linear form, but (28) 
is estimated without logs since it contains negative values for some margin observations. 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are carried out to test for st'1;tionarity of each of the 
dependent variables. In all three years, the supply and margin variables are found to be 
stationary, but not the average weight variable. This is not a concern because, as noted 
above, that equation is not fit in the estimation procedure. Godfrey's test reveals serial 
correlation in the margin equation (28) for 1994 and 1995; this is dealt with by 
employing a second-order moving average [MA(2)] error process for each, which 
successfully corrects the problem. White's test and a Breusch-Pagan test fail to reject the 
null hypothesis ofhomoskedastic residuals for those two years. No evidence of 
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in the supply equation are found for 1994 or 1995. 
The system for 1996 exhibits autocorrelation in the margin equation and 
heteroskedasticity in the supply equation. An MA(l) correction is successfully employed 
to address the first problem, and a reweighting of the residuals is carried out in an attempt 
to rectify the second. After the reweighting, the heteroskedasticity is improved but not 
eliminated. 
Chow tests for structural change are carried out at five period intervals for each 
data set. Evidence of structural change would support the hypothesis that industry 
17 
behavior alternates between collusive and reversionary periods. Interestingly, frequent 
structural changes were evident in the 1994 data, fewer in the 1995 data, and almost none 
in the 1996 data. As such, a dual regime model is necessary. 
Switching regressions may be used when it is suspected that observations on the 
dependent variable are not generated according to the usual formulation 
(30) Y = Xl3 + e, 
but rather are generated by one of two regimes 
k 
(31) Yt = I 131jXjt + e1t [ denoted regime 1 ], or 
j=l 
k 
Yt = I 132jXjt + e2t [denoted regime 2]. 
j =1 
If 131 * 132, the regression system is said to be "switching" between two regimes. Since 
which regime has generated a particular observation is usually unknown, the problem is 
how to assign each observation to one regime or another.10 This can be addressed using 
Goldfeld and Quandt's D-method for switching regressions (SAS Institute, Inc.). 
Assume that a given observation t' s inclusion in one regime or the other is 
determined by some vector of variables z = (z1, z2, ... , z0 ). Then 
p 
(32) I \j/jZjt ~ 0 
j=l 
if Yt was generated by regime 1, otherwise 
p 
I \j/jZjt > 0, 
j =1 
and Y1 was generated by regime 2, where \j/j are coefficients to be estimated. If 
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\f'z 
(33) d(zi) = (1 / .J2rccr ) J exp[-l/2(~2!o-2)d~ 
-00 
is defined as a continuous approximation to a step function, then D is the diagonal matrix 
with d(zi), i = 1,2, ... ,non the diagonal, and the parameters to be estimated are the k p1 
and k p2 parameters from (31 ), the p \jf parameters from (32), and the variances of each 
regime. The equation to be estimated for the switching regression then becomes 
(34) Y = (I - D)XP1 + DXP2 + n, 
where Q = (I-D)e1 + De2, a vector ofheteroskedastic disturbance terms, with covariance 
matrix <l>. The log-likelihood function is then 
(35) lnL = -n/2 ln2n -1/2ln J<l>J - 1/2{[Y - (I- D)XP1 -DXP2]' <l>-1 
[Y - (I-D)XP1 -DX~2]}, 
which produces maximum likelihood parameter estimates. 
The model for Zi is 
(36) Zi = a(Lt - Lt-1), 
where 'a' is a scale parameter. Equation (36) hypothesizes that there will be different 
parameters for the model based on whether the average weight of fed cattle sold is 
increasing or decreasing. It is expected that as supplies increase, packers are able to 
"back up" the showlist (although feeders may play a role in this if they try to hold out for 
better prices as their breakeven prices increase), and procure heavier cattle, which 
provides them with greater profit. This will be reflected in increasing average weight in 
fed cattle transactions, which indicate that packers may be exerting market power and 
behaving in a more collusive fashion. Conversely, if supplies are shrinking, packers must 
behave more competitively to reach their minimum cost volume. This will be reflected in 
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decreasing average weights of fed cattle purchased, and may indicate when reversionary 
periods are occurring. 
The margin equation (28) can therefore be estimated by using a switching 
regressions model with the log-likelihood equation (35). The margin equation under a 
dual-regime specification becomes 
Equation (37) is estimated using the MODEL procedure in SAS for each data set using 
N2SLS. Likelihood ratio tests are carried out for parameter constancy between regimes. 
Having modeled conduct at the industry level, it is now appropriate to attempt to 
discover individual firm behavior. Reaction functions show how packers in the 
procurement game respond to the strategic decisions of other players. Slade shows how 
the strategic interaction between players can be inferred from prices 
N 
(38) Pit= Pt* + Rt I (pjt-1 - Pt*), 
j-:td 
where Pt* is the "equilibrium" price at time t and Rt is the slope of the intertemporal 
reaction function. If (38) is rewritten to allow reaction functions to each other player j 
individually, and the strategy selection is stated in terms of price change responses to 
other strategic price changes, we have 
N 
(39) ~Pit= I Rij~Pjt-1 + ~-
j = 1 
Equation (39) asserts that firm i reacts to only those strategies chosen by other 
players in the immediately preceding period. However, it may be appropriate to make 
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two revisions to this formulation. First, the reaction functions should be allowed to take 
strategies beyond the previous period into account. Second, there is no clear reason why 
(3 8) should not be specified with an intercept. Estimation results will determine whether 
either or both restrictions imposed by Slade are true. The new formulation of the reaction 
function equation is then 
N 
( 40) ~Pit = 'lli + L Rij~Pjt-x + et, 
j=l 
where x is the number of past strategy choices of the other j packers taken into account 
by packer i when making strategy decisions. Packer i's own past strategy choices are 
also included, as in Slade. This seems appropriate since past strategy choices for a given 
packer are likely to influence current strategic decisions. Packers are likely to assess the 
success of past choices in meeting firm goals, and update decisions accordingly. 
If packers behave competitively when purchasing fed cattle, then the reaction 
functions Rij will be close to zero. This would be an indication that firms do not respond 
to others' choice of strategy when deciding upon their own. Conversely, reaction 
functions equal to 1 would be evidence of perfectly monopsonistic individual firm 
behavior, indicating that firm's strategies were set collusively. Positive values for the 
reaction functions can be associated with successful tacit collusion by the beef packing 
firms. 
Equation ( 40) is estimated for each data set with ordinary least squares using the 
AUTO REG procedure in SAS. The final model lag length of rival strategy choices 
estimated for the reaction functions of each packer is based on statistical significance. 
For instance, if estimation reveals that packer i reacts significantly to packer j's tth period 
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lagged strategy choice, then the model is estimated for strategic reactions to all packers' 
past t strategy choices. Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that no autocorrelation exists in 
the residuals; this is not surprising given that the data employed are all in first-difference 
form. Q-statistic and Lagrange Multiplier tests for ARCH (autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic) disturbances are carried out, and the null hypothesis of homoskedastic 
error terms is not rejected for the majority of the reaction function equations. Those 
models that do exhibit heteroskedasticity are.re-estimated using a GARCH (1,1) 
(generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model, which improves the 
efficiency of the estimates. 
Results 
Results for the estimation of the system (26)- (28)are presented in Table 2 for 
each of the three data sets. All of the parameter estimates except for the slope on the 
supply fucntion for 1996 are significant at the five percent level. Supply response to 
price varies across the three years. In 1995, the marketing agreement year, supply is 
more inelastic than in the·other two years. Imposition of the marketing agreement 
resulted in fewer cattle remaining to supply the three packers that were not involved in 
the agreement. Also, the negotiating strength of the largest packer was altered because it 
was constrained for a period of time to purchase most of its cattle only from certain 
feedlots. In 1996, when information was limited during part of the experiment, fed cattle 
supply was more elastic. This implies that cattle feeders are adversely affected by a lack 
of information, as they are unable to use market data to better negotiate with packing 
firms. Anderson et al. find that market efficiency suffers when less information is 
available. The model for 1994 has a slope parameter that lies between those of the other 
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two years, indicating that supply is more inelastic than when information is limited, but 
less so than when marketing agreements are imposed. 
Negative and significant coefficients on the average weight variables indicate that 
price decreases as the average weight of fed cattle traded increases. This may reflect the 
attempts of the feeders, who are aware that heavier cattle are more profitable for packers, 
to hold out for better prices. These attempts are usually doomed. For the most part, 
packers are able to avoid paying higher prices for heavier cattle, thus contributing to extra 
profitability. 
The market conduct parameters are significant for each of the three years. The 
values are all greater than zero, which is the value that would prevail in a perfectly 
competitive market. Estimation of the model for the 1994 data produces a market 
conduct parameter of 1.655, which is considerably higher than the Cournot value of 1.0 
and approaches the monopsonistic value of2.0. This indicates that beef packers were 
able to tacitly collude as ifto form an effective cartel that paid prices lower than the 
competitive levels. The impact of the marketing agreement in 1995 reduced the ability of 
packing firms to behave collusively relative to the other two years. This is contrary to 
many captive supply scenarios, but consistent with the results of Ward et al. (1998) and 
Ward et al.(1999), who found that transaction prices were higher but more variable 
during marketing agreement periods. A conduct parameter for that year of 1.025 
suggests that packer behavior was very close to Cournot conduct. This implies that 
packers were not able to achieve payoffs in the repeated game that were significantly 
different than those which would have come about in the single period game. 
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The effects upon industry conduct of restricting market information in the 1996 
experiment are less clear. The market conduct parameter is 1.579, which is closer to the 
perfectly monopsonistic level than to the Cournot level. Although feedlots appear to be 
adversely affected by limited market information, packers collude less effectively than in 
1994, which may indicate that limited market information also hindered their ability to 
exert market power. Evidence has been found that certain types of market information 
can foster market power. Albaek, Mollgaard, and Overgaard find that collusion in the 
Danish concrete industry increased after specific transactions prices began to be 
published. Wachenheim and DeVuyst hypothesize that the same may happen if 
mandatory price reporting is fully implemented in the U.S. fed cattle industry. Bastian, 
Koontz, and Menkhaus find that price levels and dispersion were reduced _when 
mandatory pricing was introduced into the FCMS. For the 1996 experiment, it seems that 
neither the packers nor the feedlots benefited substantially from limiting market 
information. This may indicate that calls for mandatory price reporting in the real market 
are unfounded. It is generally assumed that more market information will enhance 
efficiency, but that hypothesis is not supported by the evidence discovered here. 
Table 3 shows the results of the switching regression margin equation (37) 
incorporating the log-likelihood function (35). Market conduct parameters are significant 
for both regimes for each of the three years. The results for 1994 imply that during 
collusive regimes, in which the parameter is 1.891, packers are able to act in a manner 
that is close to perfectly monopsonistic. During reversionary periods, the parameter is 
lower at 1.448, but this is still much higher than the Cournot, and especially the 
competitive value. A likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that the values for the parameter 
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in collusive and reversionary periods are statistically different. In 1995, when collusion is 
hampered by the imposition of a marketing agreement, the collusive and reversionary 
period parameters are 1.209 and 1.033, respectively. They are not found to be 
significantly different; nevertheless, the results support the hypothesis that packers are 
able to behave more collusively as average weights increase. 
The results for 1996 are different from the other two years. It is found that 
conduct actually is less collusive when average weights are rising (1.270) than when they 
are falling (1.624). This, too, may be a result of limiting the information available to 
market participants, creating a market which functions less efficiently. Packers use 
(imperfect) market information to infer the conduct of their rivals in the repeated game. 
If this already imperfect information is withheld, the ability of packers to assess whether 
the cartel is in a collusive or reversionary stage is hampered. Given that the LR test fails 
to reject the hypothesis that the market conduct parameters are equal, it may be that 
information to packers is too imperfect for them to infer their rivals' strategies. II It may 
also be that with less information, feedlots do not behave as expected. Anderson et al. 
found this to be the case. This, too, could cause packer reactions to vary from those that 
would be expected. Nevertheless, the estimated parameters are well above those that 
would be expected in a competitive or Cournot market, and provide further evidence that 
beef packers are able to successfully collude in the fed cattle market. 
Reaction function coefficients for 1994, 1995, and 1996 are given in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6, respectively. Several significant reaction function parameters are evident in Table 
4. Each of packers 1, 2, and 4 react to the strategy choices of packer 3. This may 
indicate that packer 3 is a dominant firm price leader in the Stackelberg sense. Packer 3 
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itself reacts to the pricing decisions of each of the other three players at either one or two 
lags, and packer 4 has significant reaction functions for all the other packers at one lag. 
Each of the smallest two packers reacts only to packer 3. These results taken together 
provide evidence of collusive conduct in the experimental fed cattle market for that year. 
The largest two beef packing firms consider strategic choices of all the other firms, and 
even the smaller firms, which possess less market power, are able to do so. These results 
support the evidence of collusion presented in Tables 2 and 3 for the 1994 data. 
Inspection of Table 5 reveals evidence of collusive behavior by packers in the 
1995 experiment, although it is not as widespread as in 1994. Packer 2 shows the most 
evidence of collusion; it has significant responses to strategy decisions by both packers 3 
and 4. The two largest packers appear to react to each others' pricing strategies. The 
smallest packer does not appear to be able to exert much market power; this is not 
surprising given its smaller size. Interestingly, it neither behaves collusively nor does 
any other firm appear to take its strategies into account when making their own decisions. 
It is not surprising, then, that packer 1 experiences an operating loss over the course of 
the experiment. 12 Overall, packer 3 strategic decisions are, as in 1994, again the ones 
which are most frequently considered by other firms, and packer 3 again emerges as the 
Stackelberg leader in the game. 
The reaction functions shown in Table 6 exhibit less evidence of collusive 
conduct than did those for the previous two years. Packer 1 has a significant response to 
packer 2, and packer 4 is found to react to packers 1 and 3. This reaffirms the hypothesis 
that collusive behavior is more difficult to undertake when market information is limited. 
A natural question arises over the apparent contradiction between Table 2 and Table 6 
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results for 1996: why is the industry conduct parameter nearly as high as for 1994, 
whereas the individual reaction functions indicate decidedly less evidence of collusion? 
It may be that limiting information available to market participants seriously affects 
packers' ability to respond to each others' strategic decisions, but is less harmful to the 
ability of the overall cartel to behave collusively. A second possibility is that it does not 
take as much individually collusive behavior to achieve overall industry collusion as may 
be presumed. That is, overall industry conduct may discover and maintain price and 
quantity levels that are not reflected in significant individual conduct changes for 
packers. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The goal at the outset of this paper was to develop and estimate a game theoretic 
model of industry conduct and supergame strategies in a dynamic oligopsony. Data from 
an experimental market for fed cattle for three different years were used because real 
market data were not made available to researchers. A non-cooperative, infinitely 
repeated game of beef packer procurement was developed in which players were 
hypothesized to behave differently depending on fed cattle supply conditions and 
strategic considerations within the game. Player goals were assumed to be maximization 
of a discounted stream of processing profits. 
Estimation of a three equation system for fed cattle supply, average procurement 
weight, and processing margin revealed that beef packing firms are able to achieve 
various levels of successful tacit collusion, as measured by an industry conduct 
parameter. Using a switching regressions approach, it was further discovered that the 
level of collusive behavior in such a framework varies according to supply conditions for 
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fed cattle. Even at its most competitive, however, industry conduct is still substantially 
more collusive than would be the case under perfect competition. The most competitive 
behavior discovered followed a Cournot pattern. Packer conduct was also modeled at the 
firm level using a reaction function framework. Results of that method displayed 
collusive behavior, which varied by year and by firm, at the individual packer level. 
It was found that market conditions imposed by experimenters had important 
effects on the ability of packers to successfully collude. In the second year of the 
experiment, a marketing agreement imposed between the largest packer and two feedlots 
substantially reduced the collusiveness of that firm and of the industry as a whole. Firms 
were not able to exceed Coumot levels of collusiveness in that year. In the third year, 
limits were placed on the amount and types of market information made available to 
participants. It appears that this restriction weakened the bargaining position of both 
packers and feeders, and made it more difficult for packers to interpret whether their 
cartel was in a collusive or reversionary state. Levels of collusion as measured by 
industry conduct were still high, which may suggest that market information is more 
important to cattle feeders than cattle buyers. Overall, conduct of beef packers in the 
experimental market is consistent with what might be expected of cartel members 
following a trigger price strategy. Exertion of market power by packers is exhibited at 
both the industry and individual firm level. 
Possession of individual transaction price and cost data are two major advantages 
of the experimental simulation approach, and allow for more precise estimation of 
industry and individual conduct than has been carried out in previous research. The 
structure of the experimental market closely resembles that of most real market 
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procurement regions, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that given similar conditions, 
firms in the real market behave in similar ways. If this is the case, then the evidence 
discovered here supports the claims of those cattle industry stakeholders who assert that 
beef packers are able to extract excess rents from cattle feeders and in turn, from 
producers. The issue cannot be put to rest until regulators exhibit a willingness to 
provide the data they possess to researchers. 
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Notes 
1. It is important to note that only packers participate in the game. The game is played 
among packers, not between packers and cattle feeders. 
2. The Cournot solution is often referred to as the "quantity setting" solution, and is 
viewed as the intermediate result between perfectly competitive and perfectly 
monopsonistic behavior. In a perfectly competitive setting, changes in quantity 
purchased by one firm are offset perfectly by changes in quantity purchased by other 
firms, and net purchases are unchanged. In a perfectly monopsonistic setting, such a 
quantity change by one firm is matched perfectly by other firms, effectively restricting 
purchases to a higher or lower amount. In the Cournot setting, firms take each others' 
output as given, and a change in the quantity purchased by one firm has no effect on the 
quantities purchased by all other firms. 
3. It can be shown that for some classes of games with finite planning horizons, 
equilibrium points, such as the trigger strategy equilibrium discussed in this paper, 
resemble those in a game with an infinite planning horizon. 
4. Such games are sometimes referred to as having strategic time dependence. 
5. Four features of an industry are required for the Green and Porter model .to apply. 
First, the industry must be stable over time. Second, output quantity is the only decision 
variable firms can manipulate. They cannot divide the market regionally or differentiate 
their product. Third, information about the industry and its environment is public 
knowledge. Fourth, the information used by players to monitor whether the game is in a 
collusive or reversionary period (market price) must be imperfectly correlated with actual 
firm behavior ( quantity procured). 
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6. If cattle are not sold during the week in which they appear on the showlist at 1200 lbs, 
they are automatically sold to a hypothetical fifth packer at a heavy price discount. The 
effective marketing window is therefore five weeks (1100, 1125, 1150, 1175, and 1200 
lbs). 
N 
7. This is because $ = I dxi / dxj, the conjectural variation of any firm, must fall 
j=:f;i 
between 1 and -1. If$ = -1, this implies perfectly competitive conjectural variations: 
each one unit reduction in output by a firm is compensated for by an increase in one unit 
of output by other firms. This is often referred to as the Bertrand solution. On the other 
hand,$= 1 implies perfect collusion: firms match each others' quantity restrictions to 
achieve the monopsony solution. The intermediate case is the Cournot solution, where $ 
= 0. In such a scenario, firms do not respond at all to each others' quantity changes. The 
estimation methods employed here do not require the conduct parameter to fall between O 
and 2, it is a theoretical rather than empirical restriction. 
8. Feedlots minimize breakeven costs for cattle feeding at 1150 lbs in the market 
simulator, and strive to sell their cattle at that weight. Packers, on the other hand, have 
lower per-pound slaughter and fabrication costs, the heavier the cattle they procure. As 
such, the average weight variable is an indication of supply conditions, and who is 
"winning" and "losing" in price discovery negotiations between packers and feeders. 
Packers win when supplies are plentiful, and they are able to drive up the average weight 
of cattle they buy. Feeders win when supplies are tight, and they are more able to keep 
sale weights in the range that is favorable to them (Lyford et al.). 
9. Firm 1 's share is 8/40, firm 2's is 9/40, firm 3's is 11/40, and firm 4's is 12/40. 
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10. Sometimes it is possible to observe changes between regimes. Porter's analysis of 
industry behavior in the Joint Executive Committee from 1880 to 1886, when collusion 
was overt, is an example. 
11. It may also be the case that average weight, the variable chosen for Zi in equation (36) 
is not indicative of conduct for 1996. Other variables for Zi were tried, but the results did 
not change. 
12. For the 1995 data, the average profit per head processed for packers 1 through 4 is 
($1.34), $9.81, $11.28, and $15.96, respectively. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, FCMS Data, 1994-1996 
1994 1995 1996 
Trading Periods 72 92 60 
Transactions 2,664 3,450 2,197 
Average Price 78.42 78.66 78.31 
Std. Dev. 3.77 3.34 3.62 
Average Quantity 36.99 37.50 36.67 
Std. Dev. 6.28 5.57 7.61 
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Table 2. Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates for Supply and Margin 
Equations, 1994-1996 
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 
Supply Intercept 69.795* 69.919* 94.382* 
(11.642) (15.659) (21.804) 
Price/COG 0.661 * 0.425* 0.746 
(0.301) (0.256) (0.512) 
Average Weight -10.27* -10.666* -14.542* 
(1.567) (2.179) (2.787) 
Market Conduct 1.655* 1.025* 1.579* 
(0.113) (0.072) (0.264) 




Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the a= 
0.05 level. 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Switching Regressions Margin 
Equations, 1994-1996 
Parameter - 1994 1995 1996 
Market Conduct 1.448* 1.033* 1.624* 
(reversionary) (0.149) (0.106) (0.238) 
Market Conduct 1.891 * 1.209* 1.270* 
(collusive) (0.154) (0.097) (0.324) 
x-2 statistic 4.07* 0.91 0.69 
(test 81 = 82) (0.044) (0.341) (0.408) 
x: statistic 1.54 1.62 0.29 
2 _ 2) (test cr1 - cr2 (0.215) (0.203) (0.590) 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses for market conduct parameters. p-values 
are given in parentheses for test statistics. Asterisks denote significance at the a = 0.05 
level. 
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares or GARCH Estimates, Beef Packer Reaction 
Functions, 1994 
Parameter Packer 1 Packer 2 Packer 3 Packer 4 
(response to) 
Intercept 0.053 0.034 0.038 0.065 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.101) (0.125) 
Packer 1 -0.109 0.326** 0.212 0.286* 
(0.132) (0.155) (0.136) (0.149) 
0.288** 
(0.125) 
Packer 2 0.136 -0.204 0.266** 0.260** 
(0.114) (0.158) (0.117) (0.130) 
-0.180 
(0.126) 
Packer 3 0.497** 0.587** 0.015 0.340** 
(0.126) (0.165) (0.129) (0.144) 
-0.268** 
(0.130) 
Packer 4 0.110 0.071 0.096 -0.306** 









Notes: Two estimates are given for packer 3 because that was the lag length of rival 
strategies considered. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Single and double 
asterisks denote significance at the a= 0.10 and a= 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares or GARCH Estimates, Beef Packer Reaction 
Functions, 1995 
Parameter Packer 1 Packer 2 Packer 3 Packer4 
(response to) 
Intercept -0.022 -0.025 -0.024 -0.020 
(0.062) (0.139) (0.135) (0.080) 
Packer 1 0.097 0.053 0.077 -0.090 
(0.237) (0.144) (0.141) (0.194) 
Packer 2 0.122 -0.271 * 0.240 0.054 
(0.130) (0.140) (0.137) (0.136) 
Packer 3 0.246 0.333** -0.333** 0.397* 
(0.178) (0.160) (0.155) (0.207) 
Packer 4 0.180 0.367** 0.262* 0.272 
(0.160) (0.141) (0.137) (0.172) 
ARCHO 0.601 1.427** 
(0.701) (0.047) 
ARCHl 0.235 0 
(0.247) (0.00) 
GARCHl 0.345 0.028 
(0.657) (0.069) 
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Single and double asterisks denote 
significance at the a= 0.10 and a= 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares or GAR CH Estimates, Beef Packer Reaction 
Functions, 1996 
Parameter Packer 1 Packer2 Packer 3 Packer 4 
(response to) 
Intercept 0.084 0.100 0.056 0.067 
(0.026) (0.203) (0.162) (0.053) 
Packer 1 -0.060** 0.033 0.077 0.289** 
(0.141) (0.116) (0.092) (0.067) 
-0.027 
(0.082) 
Packer 2 0.578** 0.159 0.189 0.065 
(0.142) (0.162) (0.129) (0.095) 
0.037 
(0.100) 
Packer 3 0.201 0.266 0.024 0.456** 
(0.241) (0.174) (0.139) (0.139) 
0.028 
(0.063) 
Packer4 -0.123 -0.068 0.111 0.427** 
(0.184) (0.198) (0.158) (0.161) 
-0.742** 
(0.127) 
ARCHO 2.090** 0.062 
(0.067) (0.110) 
ARCHl 0 1.566** 
(0.00) (0.726) 
GARCHl 0.020 0 
(0.142) (0.00) 
Notes: Two estimates are given for packer 4 because that was the lag length of rival 
strategies considered. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Single and double 
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II. Alternative Approaches to Livestock Price Discovery: Theory and Empirical 
Estimates 
Introduction 
Commodity prices have traditionally been an area of concern for those involved in 
the supply chain for such products. Allegations of unfair pricing practices via the use of 
market power in many markets for agricultural products have been particularly prevalent. 
As such, there are persistent calls for the calculation of a "fair" price: one which would 
presumably prevail in a market governed solely by competitive forces. Accordingly, 
researchers have long striven to better understand and describe the process by which 
market prices are obtained. The focus of this paper is upon issues surrounding the 
discovery of prices in livestock markets. 
Much has been written about determining and discovering prices, but rarely is a 
specific distinction between the two explicitly noted. Price determination is the process 
in which the broad forces of supply and demand interact to clear the market and allow 
sellers and buyers to trade a given quantity of a specific good at the determined price 
(Thomsen and Foote). Textbook econometric theory focuses largely on this process. But 
given imperfect and asymmetric information, costly transactions, heterogeneous 
products, and thin, spatially dispersed markets, rarely is the process of price 
determination that simple. It is more likely, as Schroeder and Ward note, that due to 
these sources of variability, supply and demand "bands" exist, and the theoretical supply 
and demand curves may lie anywhere within these bands. As such it is possible that no 
one true equilibrium price exists across regional markets for a given time period due to 
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the disequilibrating factors listed above. Figure 1 shows how supply and demand bands 
rather than curves might appear. 
Price discovery differs from price determination, and is the process of market 
traders ascertaining a price for a certain quantity of a good with specific characteristics 
(Thomsen and Foote). Price determination creates a neighborhood of discoverable 
prices, for instance the area comprising the intersection of the demand and supply bands 
in Figure 1, and the price discovery process finds a price within this neighborhood. For 
example, the supply of and demand for beef interact to establish a general daily or weekly 
price level for fed cattle, but the quality characteristics of each animal or lot of animals 
cause a specific transaction price to be discovered. Price determination and price 
discovery are thus closely related, but distinct concepts. 
Schroeder et al. (1998) note several reasons why research on livestock price 
discovery is critically important to industry stakeholders. One of the most important is 
that large numbers of animals are still priced on averages, rather than based on the value 
of each carcass. For example, a beef packer might purchase an entire showlist from a 
cattle feeder at a single, average liveweight price, although the value of each individual 
carcass cannot be determined until after an animal is slaughtered. The same price is thus 
paid for high quality animals as for low quality animals. This type of pricing, although 
economical from the standpoint of transaction cost minimization, introduces 
inefficiencies into the livestock pricing system and hinders transparency of the price 
signal received by livestock producers. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that once a 
price is established, there is a tendency for market participants to want to trade more 
animals at that price. The result is that a large number of animals are traded at an average 
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price which may not accurately represent the value of each carcass to its end-use. market. 
Since prices are relied upon as sources of considerable information (Stigler; Garbade, 
Pomrenze, and Silber), prices which do not fully reflect the value of the underlying 
commodity are providing misleading information to industry stakeholders about which 
characteristics are valued most in their commodities. Accordingly, considerable 
inefficiency can be introduced into any market in which price discovery is not well 
understood. 
Although a good deal of empirical work for livestock price discovery has been 
carried out, no study has proposed alternative theoretical bases for price discovery and 
compared empirical results of such alternative theories using a common data set. That is 
the objective of this paper. First, a"derived demand" model, which hypothesizes that the 
transaction price is a function of supply and demand factors as well as attributes of the lot 
oflivestock in question, is developed and presented. Next, a "partial adjustment/market 
efficiency" model, which asserts that transaction prices are slow to adjust because of 
rigidities and change from recent values partly because of new information entering the 
market, is derived. It is hoped that by exploring these distinct theoretical bases, a better 
understanding of the factors most importantly affecting livestock price discovery can be 
gleaned. The empirical portion of the paper is aided by data from an experimental fed 
cattle market. 
Numerous studies using data from the real fed cattle market have attempted to 
determine the factors that are important in price determination/discovery. Ward (1981, 
1982) includes carcass price and value, futures price, quality grade; dressing percentage, . 
live weight, sex, lot size, forward contracting, bargaining price range, number of bids and 
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buyers, specific buyers, trends, and region as variables in his early fed cattle price 
discovery work. Jones et al. include many of the same factors but add yield grade, finish 
uniformity, squared live weight, weightuniformity, breed, days of feed, distance from 
packer, number of sellers, and day of the week. Schroeder et al. (1993) consider some of 
the same variables as their predecessors, but also include marketings in their model. 
Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder further find that the use ofprecommitted supplies by 
packers has a small negative effect on transactions prices. 
A good deal of research has also been carried out using data from the 
experimental fed cattle market (Ward et al. 2001). This market, described in the 
Experiment and Data section below, is designed to function in ways that are similar to the 
real market, but it can provide readily available data in a more timely fashion than can the 
real market; Ward et al. (1996) include lagged boxed beef price, lagged futures market 
price, total show list, lagged marketings, and potential profit or loss in their price 
discovery model for the experimental market. Indicator variables for specific packers, 
feedlots, transaction type ( cash or forward) and weight classes are also included. 
Anderson et al. investigate the effects of reducing public price and quantity information 
on prices in the experimental market, and find that the absence of current market 
information created market inefficiencies by increasing price risk and decreasing 
production efficiency. 
The effects of imposing a marketing agreement onto the experimental market are 
reported by Ward et al. (1999). They find that transaction prices are higher but more 
variable during agreement periods than during non-agreement periods. Ward and Lee 
investigate the effects of imposing mergers between different beef packers in the 
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experimental market, and observe, unexpectedly, that prices increase during merger 
periods. 1 Profits of the merged firm also increase, perhaps due to increased efficiency 
within the merged firm. Lyford et al. (2001) estimate the effects of increased levels of 
contracting within the experimental market, and find that greater variability of cash prices 
results. No clear effect upon price levels is found. 
The next section of the paper presents the derived demand and partial 
adjustment/market efficiency models that will be used. After that, the data employed and 
the experiment used to generate them are discussed. The following section outlines the 
procedure used; subsequently, results are presented and discussed. Finally, the paper is 
summarized and conclusions are drawn. 
Theory 
Final consumers of a good determine the shape and position of the demand 
function in the retail market. Consumers of beef, for instance, have individual demand 
schedules for various cuts possessing certain characteristics pertaining to flavor, 
tenderness, and other attributes. These demand schedules for various characteristics can 
be aggregated over consumers to allow a single retail demand function for beef to be 
conceptualized. This demand for finished beef products at the retail level is often called 
the "primary demand" for beef. 
"Derived demand" is the demand for inputs used in the production of those goods 
for which primary demand exists. Without the demand for a finished product, there 
would be no demand for the inputs to the production process that creates the finished 
product; hence, the demand for inputs is derived from the demand for finished products. 
As Tomek and Robinson note, primary and derived demand differ by the amount of 
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marketing and processing charges per unit of product. Numerous derived demand 
markets for inputs to a consumer good may exist: for instance, there is a derived demand 
for beef at the wholesale level, in the fed cattle market, and also at the stocker and 
producer levels. Demand at each of these levels is derived from the primary demand for 
beef in the retail market. 
Ladd and Martin further refine the concept of derived demand by showing how 
the price of an input is the sum of the values of that input's characteristics to the 
purchaser. Suppose the production function for boxed beef is written 
(1) Qa = Fa(<pm, <p2B, ... (pmB), 
where Q8 is the quantity of boxed beef produced by a beef packer, and the <pja are the 
j= 1, 2, ... , m input characteristics used in producing Qa. The equation then states that the 
quantity of boxed beef produced depends upon the amounts of various input 
characteristics used to produce it. Ifxm, x28, ... XnB are the quantities of inputs, including 
fed cattle, used to produce Q8, then the total amount of the jth input characteristic used in 
production can be written 
(2) (pjB = QjB (xrn, X2B, ... XmB, (pjIB, (pj2B, ... (pjnB), 
where <pjiB is the quantity of characteristic j that enters into the production of boxed beef 
through the use of one unit of input i. The production function (1) can then be rewritten 
(3) Qa = Ga(xm, X2B, ... XmB, <p1rn, <p12B, ... (pmna). 
Assuming for simplicity that the beef packing firm is a single output firm, its profit 
function is 
n 
(4) TI= PaFa(<pm, <p2B, ... <pma)- L riXiB, 
i=l 
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where PB is the price of boxed beef and ri is the price of input i. 
The profit maximizing use of input i is then given by the first-order condition 
m 
(5) an I axiB = PB I: (aFB I acpjB) (acpjB I axiB)- ri = o, 
j =1 
and the price of input i is 
m 
(6) ri = PB I (aFB I acpjB) (acpjB I axiB). 
j =1 
In this formulation, (8<pjB / 8xiB) is the marginal yield of j in the production of boxed beef 
from the ith input, and (8FB / 8<pjB) is the marginal product of one unit of j used in 
producing boxed beef. Accordingly, PB x (8FB / 8<pjB) is the value of marginal product 
for j used in boxed beef production, and can be interpreted as an imputed price paid for 
that characteristic. If the imputed price is designated as TjB, ( 6) can be rewritten as 
m 
(7) ri = I: TjB (8cpjB I axiB), 
j =1 
which says the price paid for each input to boxed beef production (including fed cattle) is 
the sum of the marginal yield values for that input's useful characteristics to boxed beef. 
In the fed cattle market, heterogeneous lots of cattle will contain different 
amounts of desirable characteristics. For example, cattle from two different weight 
groups might be processed into different amounts of boxed beef. Since saleable boxed 
beef is produced by using the useful characteristics contained in fed cattle, cattle of 
different weights are worth different amounts of money per live hundredweight. Ladd 
and Martin summarize the product characteristics approach to derived demand for inputs 
in two themes: ( 1) the price of an input equals the sum of the values of the characteristics 
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of that input to the purchaser, and (2) input demand is affected by that input's 
characteristics. If these themes hold, the characteristics of the input in question-for the 
purposes ofthis essay, fed cattle-determine its value in the product (retail) market. 
Accordingly, the same characteristics determine its value in the fed cattle market. The 
derived demand model for the fed cattle market should thus include any variables which 
capture the overall industry demand for fed cattle, as well as any variables which relate 
specifically to the characteristics of particular lots of animals. Of course, other factors, 
particularly those relating to industry current and expected supply conditions, must be 
included to ensure the derived demand model is fully specified. 
A second distinct theoretical framework for livestock price discovery stems from 
the "partial-adjustment" (PA) model, and has been used extensively for empirical 
estimation. The PA model has been developed into its modem form by Nerlove (1956a, 
1956b, 1958a, 1958b), who attempts to derive accurate estimates of supply and demand 
elasticities for agricultural products. He argues that short-run elasticities cannot be 
accurately measured because they correspond to a single point in time only, and that 
estimation oflong-run elasticities is difficult because of constantly changing prices and 
adjustment paths. As a result, he advocates a dynamic model over a static one, and 
argues that dynamic models are better at explaining data, produce coefficients that are 
more reasonable in sign and magnitude, and generate residuals that exhibit less serial 
1 . 2 corre at1on. 
To capture the dynamic aspects of agricultural supply and demand, Nerlove 
employs a distributed lag model. He assumes a behavioral model which implies a single 
period distributed lag only incidentally, rather than testing for significance at varying lag 
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lengths. Assuming static expectations, he postulates that the quantity of a commodity 
demanded changes only in proportion to the difference between the long-run equilibrium 
quantity desired and the current quantity demanded (1958a). To derive this result, he 
begins with a long-run demand function, 
(8) q*1 =a+ bPt + CYt, 
where q*t is the long-run equilibrium quantity demanded, Pt is the current price, and Yt is 
current income.3 This equation cannot be estimated directly since q*t is not observable. 
But if the relation between the current quantity qt and the long-run equilibrium quantity is 
given by the difference equation 
(9) qt - q t-1 = y (q*t - q t-1), 
where y is the coefficient of adjustment, then the first expression can be substituted into 
the second to obtain 
(10) qt= ay + b YPt + cy Yt + (1- y)qt-1 + Ut, 
which is an equation in autoregressive form, and is therefore estimable. 
PA models are widely used because of the intuitive appeal of the notion that 
quantities and prices adjust slowly over time to new conditions. Use of such models is 
common in agricultural supply analysis. Askari and Cummings survey over six hundred 
studies that employ the Nerlove formulation for various agricultural commodities, 
including beef. PA models are also common for analysis of macroeconomic variables. 
For the fed cattle market, it seems intuitive that adjustment of quantities produced to 
recent prices cannot be instantaneous. The biological production lag for cattle, 
technological rigidities, habit inertia, asset fixity, resource control, and institutional 
constraints all contribute to a gradual adjustment process. This gradual adjustment 
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process is often cited as justification for inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in 
regression models. 
Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the PA model has been the subject 
of much discussion. Waud asserts that the appropriate specification ofNerlove's model is 
(11) qt= ay6 + by6pt + cy6yt + [(1- 6)+(1-y )]qt-I - (1- 6)(1- y)qt-2 + Ut 
and that (10) is simply a special case of this expression where 6 = 1, representing the case 
where expectations are static in the adaptive sense. He notes that the users of the PA 
model implicitly assume that expectations are formed thusly, since they are not specified 
explicitly as being formed in any other way. If the value of either 6 or y is one, then the 
coefficient on qt-2 will not be significant, and the PA model is the appropriate 
specification. As will be discussed next, it is appropriate for the purposes of this paper to 
impose a value of one for 8, thus the PA model will be proper for estimation. 
Fama is widely credited with relating the level of efficiency in a market to the 
ways in which prices of assets in that market reflect different types of information. An 
efficient market, he explains, is one which fully reflects all available information. He 
develops ''weak", "semi-strong", and "strong" form tests of efficiency for markets where 
prices reflect historical, current public, and all relevant (including non-public or insider) 
information, respectively; Sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for market efficiency 
are (i) no transactions costs in trading, (ii) complete, costless information is available to 
all participants, and (iii)implications of current information for current and future prices 
is agreed upon by all participants. 
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The relevance of the market efficiency model to the fed cattle market can be seen 
by outlining the relationship between information and prices in Fama's work. Consider 
the relationship 
(12) E(pj,t+d<l>t) = [1 +E(rj,t+d<l>t )]pj,t 
where Eis the familiar expectational operator, pj,t is the price of the asset4 at time t, pj,t+I 
is the analogous price at time (t + 1), rj,t+I is the single-period percentage return on the 
asset, and <l>t is the available information set in time period t. The expression states that 
the expected price of the asset in the next period depends only on the expected return to 
the asset, given a specific information set. If the expected return to the asset is realized, 
then, the expected price of the asset in period (t + 1) will be realized unless the 
information set changes. It must then be the case that changes in information are 
responsible, in part, for changes in the price of an asset between periods. 
Garbade, Pornrenze, and Silber find that observed prices contain considerable 
information, and that market participants are alert to the quality of the information 
contained in those prices. In the context of Fama's market efficiency hypothesis, then, 
observed prices form part of the information set <l>t upon which future prices are 
conditioned. Analogously, the previous period's observed prices have an effect on the 
current period's prices insofar as they are part of the relevant information set. Market 
participants derive important information about current expected prices from lagged 
prices, and lagged prices are therefore appropriate to include in the price discovery 
model. If Fama's market efficiency concept is applied to livestock price discovery, then, 
it can be seen that the PA model is appropriate, given the important role played by the 
information contained in the lagged price. 
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Experiment and Data 
Data from the real fed cattle market are often difficult to obtain. The proprietary 
nature of many agribusiness data, particularly in the modem climate of increased 
consolidation, often means researchers have problems to address but little information 
with which to proceed. The Fed Cattle Market Simulator (FCJ\1S), an. experimental 
market for fed cattle, was developed at Oklahoma State University to mitigate the 
problem of a lack of data on transactions between beef packers and cattle feeders. The 
FCMS has been used as an aid in teaching, research, and extension. Ward et al. (1996) 
provide an in-depth description of the FCMS. 
The FCMS follows the experimental simulation approach. Four teams of two to 
four people assume the roles of beef packing firms and eight more teams manage 
simulated cattle feedlots. Each of the twelve teams has the goal of maximizing profits for 
its firm. Optimizing behavior on the part of participants is encouraged through periodic 
"updates" on the best and worst performing packer and feeder teams, respectively, as 
well as through the awarding of traveling trophies at regular intervals. The packer and 
feeder teams trade paper lots of 100 head of fed cattle in seven minute open negotiation 
trading sessions, in which members of the packer teams travel around the trading room to 
visit various feedlot teams in order to procure the cattle needed to ensure their plants run 
at or near the minimum-cost slaughter volume. Each of these trading sessions represents 
one week in the real fed cattle market. Firms may trade fed cattle on a cash or forward 
delivery basis and may also participate in futures market hedging and/or speculating. As 
these open negotiation trading sessions proceed, cash and futures market information is 
provided to the entire group of participants on electronic displays. A cyclical cattle 
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supply, intended to resemble the real fed cattle market, is part of the structure of the 
FCMS. Cattle are placed on feed at 700 lbs., gain 25 lbs. per week, and appear on the fed 
cattle market show list at 1100 lbs. Cattle remain on the showlist until they are sold or 
reach a weight of 1200 lbs.; if they are not sold by the end of the trading session in which 
they have attained that weight, the FCMS automatically sells them to a hypothetical fifty 
packer at a heavily discounted price. Packers prefer to purchase heavier cattle because of 
cost and processing economies associated therewith. Feeders, conversely, aim to sell fed 
cattle at 1150 lbs., which mimimizes their breakeven cost. 
Packers in the FCMS purchase fed cattle as inputs and produce boxed beef and 
byproducts as their outputs. The boxed beef price is based on a real market demand 
function and varies inversely with the number oflots and the weight of cattle traded. It 
relates the supply of fed cattle and their weight to the demand for beef from the wholesale 
market and thus is an important component of the derived demand price signal received 
by packers and feeders. Feeders' inputs consist of the feed required for their cattle to 
gain the requisite 25 lbs. per week, and the cost of feeder cattle, which varies inversely 
with supply. Output from the feedlots is fed cattle sold to packers. Feeders calculate and 
monitor the breakeven price for their cattle in an effort to turn at least a small profit. The 
total profits available to the industry vary as the supply of feeder cattle varies and as the 
boxed beef price varies. 
The FCMS was structured to resemble a real market fed cattle procurement 
region, in which feeders are usually more numerous than packers. As such, it is more 
difficult, ceteris paribus, for feeders to exert market power to drive up the price of fed 
cattle than it is for packers to drive the price down. It is the ability to affect market prices 
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in times of high or low supply or demand that determines the overall profitability of the 
two types of firms (Lyford et al. (2002)). The cattle feeding firms are homogeneous in 
structure, but the four packers are not; each packer has a unique minimum-cost slaughter 
volume, ranging from eight to twelve lots per week. The most successful packers tend to 
procure very close to their minimum-cost slaughter volume on a period-to-period basis. 
The FCMS generates data that occur in cross-sectional time series. Anywhere 
from twenty to fifty lots of cattle may be traded in a given trading session; the average 
over a semester-long period is between thirty-six and thirty-seven. Data for this study are 
taken from experimental sessions that took place over single academic semesters during 
each of 1994, 1995, and 1996. Agricultural economics, animal science, and agricultural 
education students participated in the experiments. Total trading weeks varied slightly 
over the three years, thus only the common transaction periods are included here, 
allowing for direct comparison of the estimated coefficients. During the sixty common 
transaction periods, 2,198 transactions took place during 1994, 2,210 during 1995, and 
2,197 during 1996. Summary statistics for the three years' data are shown in Table 1. 
Carlberg and Ward use ANOVA to test the hypothesis that the data generated in each of 
the three years are not significantly different. The hypothesis is not rejected. 
Procedure 
Jones et al. assert that since the short-run supply of cattle is inelastic, the derived 
demand model for cattle can be expressed in price-dependent form. The model must 
include those variables that capture the input demand characteristics of fed cattle, as well 
as other variables theoretically justified by their effects on transaction prices in the 
experiment. Accordingly, the derived demand model is specified as 
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2 4 8 
+ L P6k DTYPEi kt+ L P11 DPCKRnt + L Psm DFDRimt + eit , 
k=l l=I m=l 
where the variables are as defined in Table 2. Lagged boxed beef is included because it 
is the mechanism through which demand conditions at the wholesale (and hence retail) 
markets are coordinated with supply conditions in the fed cattle market. This variable 
should have a positive coefficient; as the boxed beef price increases, packers are able to 
pay more for fed cattle. The boxed beef price is lagged in the model because the most 
recent period's price is the information most useful to participants for price discovery. 
The lagged futures price is also included; it provides an indication of expected market 
conditions and forms part of the information set used to calculate expected prices. The 
lagged futures price coefficient is also expected to be positive. 
Two variables which capture the supply conditions in the experiment are included 
in the derived demand model. The total show list variable gives the total number of lots 
of cattle available for sale by cattle feedlots at the beginning of the market period. The 
greater the number of cattle on the show list, the lower should be the transaction price. 
Lagged marketings are also included as an indication of volume of the previous period's 
sales. It is expected that a greater volume of sales in the previous period will have caused 
prices to decline in that period, and that the pattern oflower prices should prevail in the 
current period. 
As noted above, the weight of the lot of cattle traded is important to both packers 
and feeders. Animal weight is important according to the product characteristics model, 
and is expected to significantly affect transaction prices. The expected sign of the ·· 
58 
coefficient is ambiguous; cattle feeders do not like to keep heavier cattle on the show list 
but packers prefer to slaughter them. The sign of the parameter estimate will therefore 
depend on the negotiating skill and strength of the packer and feeder teams. 
Three classes of indicator variables are included in the model; one each for 
transaction type, specific packer, and specific feeder. The transaction type variable 
specifies cash or forward contract transaction. Carlton shows that uncertainty and 
transaction costs create incentives for firms to use contracts. If these incentives are 
strong enough, contract prices will exceed cash prices. However, Eilrich et al., using data 
from 68 pens of cattle marketed over two years, find that net basis contract prices are 
lower than cash prices. As such, there is no clear expected sign for the variable. The 
variables for packers and feeders are included to capture the effects of individual 
negotiating and reputational effects of the teams. No a priori expectations for parameter 
sign are attached to any particular packing or feeding firm. 
The partial-adjustment/market efficiency model includes all of the same variables 
as the derived demand model, but also contains lagged average price to capture rigidities 
and inertia in the beef supply chain and the informational content of past prices. A lag 
length of one on the price time series is assumed because it captures the essence of the 
partial-adjustment model advocated by Nerlove (1956a, 1956b, 1958a, 1958b) and the 
market efficiency model of Fama (1970). The partial-adjustment/market efficiency model 
is then 
2 4 8 
YP6 WT it+ L P1k DTYPEikt + L Ps1 DPCKRnt + L P9m DFDRimt + eit· 
k=l l=l m=l 
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A "mixed model" is used to estimate equations (13) and (14) for each of the three 
years' data. The mixed model is a generalization of the standard linear formulation, but 
allows both the means and the variances of data to be modeled. The parameters of the 
mean model are the "fixed-effects" parameters, and are associated with known 
regressors, as in usual estimation procedures. The parameters of the variance-covariance 
model can be specified in the mixed model as following a number of alternative 
covariance structures. This allows a more flexible specification of the covariance of the 
error term than does the standard linear model. A "random-effects" specification is 
chosen for the experimental market data. In the random-effects specification, a dual-
component error term is assumed 
(15) eit = Ut + Vit, 
where u1 is an effect that is unique a specific cross-section (panel) of data and Vit is the 
portion of the error term associated with the ,overall model. In the experimental market, 
u1 is specified as being unique to each trading session. The random-effects specification 
is tested with a likelihood ratio (LR) test as the unrestricted variance-covariance structure 
versus the restricted case of the general linear model. The test statistic is 
(16) -2(lnLR - lnLu),.., x.2 (J), 
where J is the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters in 
the restricted versus unrestricted specification of the covariance structure. In this case, 
J=l. 
The mixed linear model can be written as 
(17) PRit = x~ + z11 + e1; 
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where Xis the matrix of observations on the known regressors in (13) and (14), ~ is the 
vector of fixed-effects parameters, 11is the vector of random-effects parameters, Z is the 
known design matrix of 11, and et is the vector of error terms. The elements of et are no 
longer required to be independent and homogeneous (SAS Institute, Inc.). The MIXED 
procedure in SAS is used to estimate (13), and the NLMIXED procedure is used to 
estimate (14), employing restricted maximum likelihood (REML) as the estimation 
method.5 
Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity of the price time series were carried out. If the 
series were not stationary, estimation results could be spurious (Kennedy). The 
V ARMAX procedure in SAS was used to carry out the test for each of the three data sets, 
and none was found to be nonstationary. 
Though economic theory should dictate choice of model, other factors are often 
considered as well. McGuirk, Driscoll, and Alwang discuss the importance of a battery 
of misspecfication tests to minimize erroneous conclusions. Since this paper focuses on 
alternative theoretical bases for price discovery rather than specification tests, only 
standard tests are carried out. Criteria such as R2, Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), 
and the Schwartz's Bayesian Criterion (SBC) can also be used for model selection. Since 
REML is used, R2 cannot be calculated, and a likelihood-based criterion must be 
employed instead. The AIC increases as R2 increases, but degrades as model size 
increases (Greene). It can be written as 
(18) AIC(K) = log (e'e / n) + 2K In, 
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where n is the number of observations and Kis the number of model parameters. 
Schwartz's Baysian criterion is calculated in a similar way, but has a greater penalty for 
added regressors. It is calculated as 
(19) SBC(K) = log (e'e / n) + K log n / n, 
and will lean toward a simpler model. Both the AIC and SBC were calculated for each of 
the three years' data for both models. 
Results 
Results of the REML estimation of the mixed model as shown in equations (13) 
and (14) are presented in Table 3. It is clear that the derived demand and partial-
adjustment/market efficiency models produce substantially different estimates for some 
of the coefficients. The coefficients on lagged marketings are lower for the partial 
adjustment/market efficiency model than for the derived demand model in each of the 
three years. For the other supply variable (total show list), the coefficients are higher for 
the PA/ME model in two of the three years. Overall, the expected signs are obtained on 
the supply variables in all but one case. 
In two of the three years, coefficients are higher for lagged boxed beef prices in 
the PA/ME model than in the derived demand model. Similarly, estimates for lagged 
futures market prices are higher in the P AIME model for two of three years. Conversely, 
coefficients on the weight variable are lower for two of the years, and higher for the third. 
Estimates of the effect of cash versus forward contract transaction are similar in 
magnitude for both models for each of the three years, as they are for the other indicator 
variables. 
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The expected signs are obtained for nearly all variables under either specification. 
The adjustment coefficient (y) is positive in each of the three market efficiency models 
and of similar magnitude for two out of the three years. The coefficients for the 1994 and 
1996 data indicate that from the perspective of the PA model, adjustment is rather slow 
(recall the coefficient is 1 minus the partial adjustment factor) at approximately twenty-
five percent per trading period. The much quicker adjustment speed in the 1995 
experiment could be the result ofless reliance on the previous period's price as a source 
of information. It could also be the result of some behavioral traits peculiar to the group 
of participants that year. 
The coefficient on lagged boxed beef is significant and of the expected sign for 
five of the six models estimated, providing support for its hypothesized effect on fed 
cattle transactions prices. The derived/primary demand relationship therefore appears to 
hold in the experimental market. Similarly, the futures price variable has the expected 
sign for each of the models and is significant for five out of six of the models. This 
indicates that participants take the futures market into account when negotiating bid/ask 
prices. 
The two supply variables behave as anticipated in the estimated models. Lagged 
marketings have a negative and significant (at least at the 0.10 level) effect on prices in 
four of six models. Similarly, the total show list variable has the expected negative sign 
in all models, and is significant in all but one. The theoretical result that prices will 
decline as supply increases is clearly borne out in the experimental market. 
The weight variable has a negative effect on price in each model, and is 
significant in four out of six. This means that packers were able to procure heavier cattle 
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at a discount, even though such animals are more valuable to them. Feeders, therefore, 
are twice damaged by keeping cattle too long on the showlist: they become costly to feed 
as the minimum break.even price of 1150 lbs. is passed, and less money is received from 
the packers, as well. That packers can pay less for animals worth more to them may be 
evidence that negotiating strength switches to them as cattle weight increases, as Lyford 
et al. (2002) find. 
The cash sale variable is significant in each of the six models, and has a negative 
effect on transaction prices for 1994 and 1996, but not 1995. This may indicate that the 
reduced transactions costs and uncertainty associated with contracting are sufficient to 
increase forward contract prices. In 1995, a marketing agreement was imposed between 
the largest packer and two of the feedlots. This may have reduced the potential gains to 
additional contracting in that year, explaining the positive sign on the cash transaction 
estimate. It is also possible that the effects of cash sales on transactions prices are very 
sensitive to specific participants in the experimental market. Simply put, some 
participants may be better able to take advantage of different pricing methods than others. 
Results of LR tests for the appropriateness of the random-effects specification of 
the variance-covariance model are shown in Table 4. The unrestricted model, which 
contains a random effect specific to the transaction week, is found to be the correct 
specification. The calculated test statistic exceeds the critical x2 value with one degree of 
freedom of 6.63 for each of the three years. This supports the hypothesis that intraweek 
variability is an important component of the mixed model applied to data from the 
experimental market. Were this variability not accounted for, estimated coefficients 
would be less efficient than they are under the correct specification. 
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The AIC and SBC selection criteria are presented in Table 5. It should be stressed 
that theory and not fit is the appropriate method for model choice. Nevertheless, in this 
case it is found that the partial-adjustment/market efficiency model provides a better fit 
than the derived demand model for each of the three years' data. This may be further 
justification for inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in empirical livestock price 
discovery work. Informational content of past prices appears to contribute considerable 
information to current period price discovery. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of the research reported in this paper was to present and compare 
alternative theories and empirical models of price discovery, with a focus on livestock 
markets. Given current levels of average versus value-based pricing, understanding the 
price discovery process in livestock markets is important for industry stakeholders so that 
they can interpret price signals accurately. Much empirical work for livestock price 
discovery has been previously carried out, both for the real and experimental markets. 
This paper used data from an experimental market for fed cattle to illustrate differences 
between two plausible theoretical models. 
Derived demand and partial-adjustment/market efficiency models for transaction 
prices in the experimental market were specified and estimated for 1994, 1995, and 1996 
using a mixed linear model. Nearly 2,200 observations were included in each of the three 
data sets. A random-effects covariance structure was selected to allow intraweek 
variability of transactions prices to be explicitly considered in estimation. Likelihood 
ratio tests were carried out to assess the validity of the random-effects versus the 
restricted covariance structure and it was found that the random-effects specification is 
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appropriate. The regressors in each of the models were specified as fixed-effects 
parameters. Finally, model selection criteria were outlined and presented. While these 
criteria should be of secondary importance when choosing a model, they are often used 
by researchers to aid in that task. 
Most of the variables included in the models had the expected sign and were 
significant at the five percent level for each data set. Inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable in the partial-adjustment/market efficiency model changed the magnitudes of 
estimates of other regressors relative to the derived demand model, but in general did not 
affect their significance. Parameter estimates for each of the three years' data were 
similar with a few exceptions. 
The choice of theoretical model is the first and most important step in any applied 
research. Often, the researcher will have alternative theoretical models from which he 
may choose; more than one specification may be appropriate for the problem at hand. 
Choice of model should be based on research objectives. For the fed cattle market, a 
strong case can be made for use of either the derived demand or partial-adjustment/ 
market efficiency model. If it is believed that the past observations on the dependent 
variable are important in explaining current values due to a slow adjustment process or 
informational content of lagged values, then that model is the correct specification. If the 
researcher feels that the characteristics of the fed cattle, along with the supply and 
demand conditions, are enough to fully describe transaction prices, then the derived 
demand model will suffice. As has been shown, either model produces reasonable 
estimates; for this research, Akaike's Information Criterion and Schwartz's Bayesian 
Criterion both indicate that the partial adjustment/market efficiency model provides a 
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1. With fewer firms, it is generally expected that oligopsony profits would increase 
2. In fact, Nerlove was quite proud of the fact that his models produced Durbin-Watson 
statistics very close to 2.0. Unbeknownst to him, this was more a result of statistical bias 
than of correct model specification. The Durbin-Watson d statistic is now regarded as an 
inappropriate test for serial correlation in models with lagged dependent variables. 
3. Nerlove deflated price and income. 
4. Fama's research involved capital market goods (ie stock market securities), but the 
analysis can be generalized to any asset of value, including an input to a production 
process, such as fed cattle. 
5. Because of the presence of the partial adjustment coefficient yin (14), NLMIXED 
rather than MIXED must be used. The procedures work in otherwise identical ways. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, FCMS Data, 1994-1996 
1994 1995 1996 
Trading Periods 60 60 60 
Transactions 2,198 2,210 2,197 
Average Price 78.59 78.53 78.31 
Std. Dev. 3.46 3.65 3.62 
Average Quantity 36.60 36.80 36.67 
Std. Dev. 6.27 6.12 7.61 
73 
Table 2. Variable Descriptions for Derived Demand and Partial-Adjustment/ 












fed cattle transaction price i in period t, ($/cwt) 
lagged average transaction price, ($/cwt) 
boxed beef price, lagged one period, for Choice YGl-3 550-700 
lb carcasses, ($/cwt) 
live cattle futures closing price, lagged one period, for the nearby closing 
Month, ($/cwt) 
total pens of cattle marketed/purchased, lagged one period 
total pens of cattle on the show list the beginning of the period 
weight of the lot of animals traded in transaction i during time 
period t (i.e. 1100 lbs, 1125 lbs, etc.) 
( 
zero-one dummy variable for transaction type; k= 1-2 1 =cash 2=forward 
contract Base=forward contract 
zero-one dummy variable for individual packers; 1=1-4 l=PCKRl 
2=PCKR2 3=PCKR3 4=PCKR4 Base=PCKRl 
zero-one dummy variable for individual feedlots; m=l-8 l=FDRl 
2=FDR2 3=FDR3 4=FDR4 5=FDR5 6=FDR6 7=FDR7 8=FDR8 
Base=FDRl 
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Table 3. Mixed Model Estimates for Derived Demand and Partial-Adjustment/ 
Market Efficiency Models, 1994-1996 
1994 1995 1996 
Variable Der.Dem. Mkt.Eff Der.Dem. Mkt.Eff. Der.Dem. Mkt.Eff 
Intercept 15.601 ** 15.411 22.883** 14.652 30.819** 92.488** 
(7.437) (14.052) (7.390) (10.325) (9.775) (43.955) 
Gamma 0.265** 0.575** 0.233** 
(0.057) (0.073) (0.097) 
BBPt-1 0.339** 0.522** 0.346** 0.407** 0.183** -0.139 
(0.043) (0.096) (0.029) (0.042) (0.053) (0.232) 
FUTt-1 0.372** 0.189 0.353** 0.376** 0.501 ** 0.645** 
(0.084) (0.162) (0.067) (0.089) (0.082) (0.247) 
MKTt-1 -0.096** -0.235** -0.051** -0.056* 0.022 -0.196 
(0.029) (0.067) (0.024) (0.032) (0.034) (0.153) 
TSLt -0.024** -0.015 -0.061 ** -0.044** -0.067** -0.091 ** 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.034) 
WTit -0.001 -0.003 -0.006** -0.008** -0.0057** -0.0024* 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash sale -0.312** -0.307** 0.328** 0.342** -0.804** -0.799** 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.102) (0.101) (0.100) (0.099) 
Packer 2 -0.490** -0.490** -0.362** -0.357** -0.089 -0.095 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.076) (0.076) (0.085) (0.085) 
Packer 3 -0.267** -0.268** -0.287** -0.288** -0.125* -0.125* 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Packer 4 -0.155** -0.155** -0.153** -0.148** 0.329** 0.329** 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.074) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) 
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Table 3. Mixed Model Estimates for Derived Demand and Partial-Adjustment/ 
Market Efficiency Models, 1994-1996 (continued) 
1994 1995 1996 
Variable Der.Dem Mkt.Eff Der.Dem Mkt.Eff. Der.Dem Mkt.Eff 
Feedlot 2 0.059 0.056 0.156** 0.155 0.646** 0.647** 
(0.074) (0.075) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) 
Feedlot 3 -0.113 -0.112 0.842** 0.830** 0.849** 0.848** 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.103) (0.103) (0.111) (0.111) 
Feedlot 4 -0.012 -0.011 0.478** 0.477** 1.173** 1.172** 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.100) (0.100) (0.110) (0.110) 
Feedlot 5 -0.375** -0.372** 0.605** 0.611 ** 0.792** 0.079** 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.100) (0.100) (0.113) (0.112) 
Feedlot 6 0.057 0.055 0.442** 0.441 ** 0.752** 0.762** 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.097) (0.097) (0.112) (0.112) 
Feedlot 7 -0.170** -0.177** 0.417** 0.414** 0.678** 0.682** 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.099) (0.099) (0.109) (0.109) 
Feedlot 8 -0.066 -0.069 0.270** 0.272** 0.748** 0.743** 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.099) (0.099) (0.114) (0.114) 
Note: double and single asterisks denote significance at the five and ten percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Likelihood Ratio Tests of Random-Effects Model, 1994-1996 
Test Statistic 
Likelihood Ratio 









Table 5. Akaike's Information Criterion and Schwartz's Bayesian Criterion for 






























Figure 1. Supply and Demand Bands 
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III. Success Factors for Value-Added New Generation Cooperatives 
Introduction 
Agricultural producers have long sought to capture a greater share of the 
downstream value their commodities create. As rural population and incomes dwindle, 
the need to do so is becoming increasingly more pressing. Farmers have a long tradition 
of cooperative behavior, both in purchasing inputs and in collectively marketing their raw 
products. Today, there are more than 40,000 cooperatives in the United States, 
generating over $120 billion in economic activity (United States Department of 
Agriculture). Most recently, in an effort to add value to their products, farmers have 
begun to vertically integrate into processing activiti~s, often in the form of New 
Generation Cooperatives (NGCs). In 1997, the "value added" of farmer cooperatives 
topped $10 billion (Kraenzle and Cummins). 
Typically, an NGC (previously called a New Wave Cooperative, or Next 
Generation Cooperative) retains the traditional cooperative tenets of one member/one 
vote (though this may vary by state) and dividends based on patronage, but has two 
important additional characteristics (Stephanson, Fulton, and Harris). The first is 
delivery rights tied to share issuance. Investors in NGCs typically help fund construction 
or purchase of a processing facility through the purchase of shares which entail the 
obligation to deliver one unit of the applicable commodity per share. The second unique 
NGC characteristic is restricted membership. Membership is restricted to those who 
provide the equity capital (and thus incur the risk) for the venture, and new shares are 
generally not issued unless the processing facility requires expansion. Usually, shares in 
NGCs can be traded, although the approval of the NGC board of directors is often 
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required. This is to done to prevent private corporations from acquiring control of the 
cooperative. Cook proposes a four-stage model of cooperative genesis, growth, and 
demise, and shows how NGCs are a natural outcome in the process. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the importance of various factors to the 
success ofNGCs, as rated by managers of those enterprises. Torgerson (2001a) points 
out that research is essential to learning about the success and failure of cooperatives. 
Results of the research reported here will allow the quantification of perceptions that 
exist about the factors that are important to new generation cooperatives. These 
enterprises have purposes and goals that are distinct from traditional cooperatives, but are 
also distinct from investor owned firms. As such, knowledge about those factors which 
NGCs rate as most important to their success can provide important information to both 
existing and new NGCs, as well as to extension agents and government personnel who 
are involved in their development. 
Survey 
Data for this paper were collected via a survey ofNGCs operating in several 
agricultural industries. The survey, shown in Appendix A, was designed to have 
managers or directors ofNGCs rank five factors in each often categories from most to 
least important to the success of their cooperative. Factors to be included in the survey 
were identified through a review of cooperative and business literature (i.e. Cooper), and 
through meetings between the author and extension personnel at Oklahoma State 
University. Each of the five factors in a category was assigned a value from 1 to 5, with 
1 being assigned to the factor perceived to be most important to the respondent's own 
NGC. Each number could be used only once in each category, with no ties in importance 
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being assigned. Respondents were also asked to rank the categories themselves in order 
of importance, from 1 to 10, using each ranking only once. The categories, in order of 
presentation on the survey, were "Product Related", "Human Resource/Organizational", 
"Government/Regulatory Environment", "Financing and Costs", "Logistics", 
"Operational", "Industry", "Managerial", "Strategic", and "Planning and Development". 
The list of potential respondents came mainly from the Illinois Institute for Rural 
Affairs' (IIRA) "Directory of New Generation Cooperatives", with additional NGCs 
identified via discussions with extension personnel and an internet search. A list of 72 
potential respondents was identified, representing most of the NGCs currently in 
existence. 1 Each NGC was contacted in advance to identify a suitable recipient and solicit 
participation, and the survey was then mailed accordingly. After three mailings, a 75% 
response rate was attained. 2 Respondents were then placed into one of eight groups, each 
representing closely related commodities or processing activities. If a respondent did not 
clearly fit into one of the eight commodity/activity groups, it was placed in a ninth group, 
which included one anonymous response. Table 1 shows the commodity/activity groups 
and the number of respondents classified into each. 
Unweighted Mean Factor Ratings 
Figures 1 to 10 show the individual category factor ratings given by the 50 
respondents. The horizontal bars illustrate the distribution of aggregate responses for 
each factor, with the number of responses given within or just after each region within 
each bar. The text below the bars gives the number of responses (N) to each factor 
rating, the mean, and the median response. Because not each of the 50 respondents rated 
each category or each factor, the number of responses within each category ranges from 
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44 to 49. Table 2 presents the results of ANOVA tests for significant differences 
between the means of each factor rating in each category, showing which factors were 
rated statistically differently from other factors in the same category. Differences in 
means in Table 3 are discussed when Table 2 shows them to differ at the 5% significance 
level. Table 3 gives the mean responses for each factor for the groups defined in Table 1. 
Numbers in parentheses in Table 3 denote statistically significant differences in least-
squares (LS) mean responses between groups at the 10% significance level. LS means 
estimate the marginal means over a balanced population (SAS Institute, Inc.), and were 
used because of the different number ofrespondents in each category. It should be noted 
that while significantly different LS means between group factor ratings are strong 
evidence of different mean ratings, lack of significance in LS mean differences does not 
necessarily mean the groups rated factors the same. Because of the small group sizes, LS 
means may not be able to determine statistically significant differences with an 
appropriate degree of certainty. 
Product Related 
Figure 1 shows that "product quality", was ranked most important in this category 
by 27 of 48 respondents, second most important by 16, third most by 3, fourth most by 3, 
and least important in the category by no respondents. The mean response was 1.6, and 
the median was 1, and Table 2 shows that it was ranked significantly higher than all other 
factors in the category. Comparing these results with others in Figure 1, it is clear that 
"product quality" was rated most important in the category across all respondents. 
"Customer service" was rated the second most important, "product uniqueness" third, 
"technology incorporated" fourth, and "brand recognition" fifth. ANOV A results 
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indicate that the factors ranked third and fourth were not significantly different and 
neither were those ranked fourth and fifth, although the third ranked factor was 
significantly higher than the fifth. 
There are some noteworthy results of LS means comparisons of the factors in the 
"Product Related" category; These are shown in Table 3. Respondents in Group 6, which 
includes perishable table-ready products, rated "product uniqueness" significantly higher 
than did respondents in Group 1 (Com Processors/Ethanol/Energy) and Group 7 
(Coffee/Sugar/Table Nuts). That Group 1 respondents did not rate this factor very high is 
not surprising, given that users of their products are mostly industrial and there is little to 
distinguish their product from competitors'. The finding of significant differences for 
this factor between Groups 6 and 7 is more interesting, since they both produce final 
consumer products. It is likely that the significant difference in responses is due to the 
more perishable nature of products in Group 6 versus Group 7, and to the fact that several 
of the NGCs in Group 6 specialize in the marketing of organic produce, itself an 
especially unique good. Table 3 also reveals significant differences in LS means for the 
"technology incorporated" factor. Group 1 and Group 4 (Oilseed Processors) both 
ranked this factor significantly higher than did Group 2 (Livestock) and Group 6. This 
result is not unexpected, given that the NGCs in the former two groups are involved in 
processing, whereas those in the latter two groups focus on marketing activities. "Brand 
recognition" was rated significantly higher by NGCs in Group 8 (Producer Alliances) 
than in Group 9 (Other/Anonymous). This may be due to the fact that Group 9 NGCs are 




"Labor force quality" was the highest ranked factor in this category, with more 
than half of the respondents rating it most important. ANOVA results imply that it was 
ranked significantly higher than all other factors in the category (Figure 2). By simple 
means, the second through fifth most important factors were "communication within co-
op", "communication with board", "communication with members", and "use of outside 
experts", although ANOVA results indicate that the second and third ranked factors were 
not significantly different and neither were the fourth and fifth ranked. It was expected 
that "communication with board" would be highly rated. This is because, as Wadsworth 
(2000) observes, conflicts between managers and board members, which are disruptive to 
smooth corporate governance, occasionally arise. Wadsworth (2001) further finds that 
effective member relations are essential to cooperative success. Additionally, Trechter 
and King outline how effective cooperative communication can help build member 
commitment, and Allen discusses how a strong communication network was important to 
the success of a prominent nut cooperative. 
LS means comparisons suggest that the "use of outside experts" factor was 
significantly more important to Group 2 respondents than to those in Groups 6 or 7. This 
could be due to the fact that NGCs in the latter groups are involved in more mature 
industries where virtually all needed expertise has been internalized through the hiring of 
experienced managers and technology specialists. Also, those livestock NGCs that are 
involved in processing are more likely to have to use outside experts to meet special 
regulatory requirements. For instance, HACCP, waste handling, and environmental 
impacts may all represent greater concerns to NGCs in Group 2 than those in Groups 6 
85 
and 7. Although it did not show up in the LS means comparisons, in general those groups 
(i.e. 1, 4, 5) that are highly mechanized had higher rankings for "quality of labor force" 
than those who are more focused on marketing (i.e. 2, 6). 
Government/Regulatory 
This category had the lowest response rate, with only 44 or 45 of the 50 
respondents rating the various factors, as shown in Figure 3. Reluctance to rank the 
factors in this category may be a reflection of the perception on the part ofNGC 
managers that government does not have an important role to play in their operation. 
"Co-op existence laws", "co-op tax advantages (i.e. 521 tax status)"3, and "direct 
government agency funding" were rated first, second, and third by simple arithmetic 
means. "Co-op existence laws" received the highest number of#l rankings, though 
ANOVA reveals that the ratings of the top three factors were not significantly different. 
"Demand enhanced by regulation" and "government planning support/technical 
assistance" were ranked fourth and fifth most important, but again ANOV A shows that 
their overall ratings are not significantly different. They were, however, ranked 
significantly lower than the top three factors. 
"Co-op tax advantages (i.e. 521 tax status)" was revealed by LS means to be 
significantly more important to NGCs in Group 5 (which contained relatively "newer" 
NGCs) than Group 7 (relatively "older"). NGCs in the latter group may have been less 
able to take advantage of 521 tax status because they already had an institutional structure 
in place when the legislation was passed. Although LS means do not show a significant 
difference, "demand enhanced by regulation" is rated substantially more highly by Group 
1 NGCs than by those in any other group. This is because most in that group are 
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involved in the production of ethanol, which benefits from government regulation in two 
ways: first, regulations requiring·ethanol blended gasoline exist or are pending in several 
states. Second, corn processing plants receive a large government subsidy if they 
produce at least one million gallons per month. That is likely the reason that most 
ethanol NGCs have almost exactly that production capacity. 
Financing and Costs 
In this category, ANOVA results suggest that "low operating costs" and "member 
capital base" were not statistically different as the two most important factors. The 
arithmetic mean was slightly more favorable for "low operating costs", but more 
respondents rated "member capital base" as the most important factor in the category 
(Figure 4). Those two factors were thus virtually tied for top rank, but were both ranked 
significantly higher than "Low financing costs", which came in third. That factor was 
followed by "output price stability" and "input price stability", which were not 
statistically different according to ANOVA, though the former factor was chosen as most 
important in the category by seven respondents, compared to only one for the latter. Both 
were statistically different from "low operating costs". 
Although no significant differences among groups were revealed by LS means 
analysis, some interesting comparisons can be made. For instance, "low operating costs" 
was rated most important for Groups 3, 4, 6, and 7, whereas "member capital base" was 
the top choice for Groups 1, 2, 5, and 8. Many NGCs in the latter groups have substantial 
regulatory requirements to meet and incur considerable expense in meeting them. For 
instance, ethanol producers must adhere to regulations by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, as well as the Department of Energy. They are also highly 
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automated, requiring considerable capital investment. So are NGCs in Group 5, who 
must build or purchase a flour mill to handle their processing requirements. Some Group 
2 (Livestock) NGCs, similarly, must adhere to food safety guidelines, as required by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS). Gehrke and Matson note that lack of capital was the primary cause of failure for 
the earliest cooperative meatpacking efforts from 1914-1920. Campbell (2001) observes 
that Farmland, the most successful livestock NGC, could not have survived without 
requiring a large initial investment by members. Co-ops that have these types of 
requirements need large cash infusions and are likely to consider "member capital base" 
relatively more important than an NGC focused mainly on marketing activities, for 
example, an organic vegetable cooperative in Group 6. 
Logistics 
Figure 5 shows that "Proximity to inputs" is ranked the highest in this category by 
arithmetic mean, followed by "transportation/ distribution infrastructure" and "site 
selection". ANOVA reveals that of those three factors, the first and second are not 
significantly different and neither are the second or third, but the first and third differ, and 
so by transitivity the three factors can be ranked. Note also that the number of 
respondents who rated each of those three factors as most important in the category are 
very similar. Though ANOVA shows "proximity to customers" to be statistically the 
same as "site selection", transitivity again illustrates that the former is rated fourth rather 
than third. "Geographical member dispersion" is rated as the least most important factor 
in the category. 
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NGCs in Groups 5 and 6 both rated "proximity to customers" more important 
than did those in Group 1, according to LS means. This is due to the perishable nature of 
the products in the former two groups versus the latter. Most of the NGCs in Group 5 
produce flour and/or flour-based products, and most of the those in Group 6 produce 
perishable table-ready produce. Both of these products must be handled carefully, and 
neither can be stored for long periods oftime without risk of contamination or spoilage. 
Ethanol, which is the main product of Group 1 NGCs, can be stored and transported more 
easily and with less risk of insect infestation, so it is not surprising that NGCs in that 
group rated "proximity to customers" as significantly less important than did their 
counterparts from Groups 5 and 6. Conversely, "proximity to inputs" was rated by Group 
1 NGCs more highly than by those in Group 5. To save transportation costs for bulky 
com, ethanol is usually made "on the spot", with co-products then used in nearby feedlots 
or dairy operations. The end product of wheat processors, conversely, is easily 
contaminated and so should be produced close to end markets to reduce shipping costs 
and losses. For this type ofNGC, the input rather than the output is shipped nearer to end 
use points, since a high percentage of the input is transformed into a desirable output. 
Operational 
"Strong selling/marketing effort" was rated highest by 17 of the respondents, 
making it the overall most important factor in the category (Figure 6). "Business 
volume", "risk management", and "targeted customer base" were second, third, and 
fourth in terms of simple means, though ANOV A shows them to be not statistically 
different. Those three were all rated statistically lower than "strong selling/marketing 
effort", but all were higher than the lowest rated factor, "vertical integration". This 
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indicates that NGCs do not consider further downstream marketing activities to be 
important, possibly because they have vertically integrated as far as they can while still 
maintaining a market presence. The initial feasibility study may have shown that farther 
integration is infeasible, and there could be simply be too much uncertainty associated 
with going any farther. 
Group 6 rates "targeted customer base" as significantly more important than does 
either of Groups 1 or 5 according to LS means. This is not unexpected due to the 
influence of specific consumer tastes on the activities ofNGCs in that group. For 
instance, many NGCs in Group 6 are organic vegetable cooperatives, and target their 
products to very health-conscious produce buyers. NGCs in Groups 1 and 5, on the other 
hand, produce more homogeneous and commonly used products and do not target 
specific consumer segments as customers. This is not to say that NGCs in those two 
groups do not focus on selling. In fact, Table 3 shows that "strong selling/marketing 
effort" is the most important factor in the category to NGCs in both Groups 1 and 5. 
Group 7, on the other hand, rated "business volume" as most important in the category, 
reflecting their reliance on high volume/low margin sales. 
Industry 
"Reputation" and "market size" have the same mean and are not statistically 
different according to ANOV A, although the former has a lower median and more 
respondents rated it highest in the category (Figure 7). By simple means, the third 
through fifth rated factors ( all ranked statistically lower than "reputation" and "market 
size") are "number of competitors", "competitors' prices", and "economic climate", 
though the mean responses for each of those factors were not significantly different. The 
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medians of the first two of those three factors were equal, but the third had a lower 
median, indicating that it may be the least important in the category according to the 
respondents. 
Groups 2, 3, and 6 all rated "reputation" significantly higher than did Group 5 
according to LS means. The simple means given in Table 3 also show that Groups 1, 4, 
and 7 also did not rate "reputation" as highly as did Groups 2, 3, and 6. This indicates 
that those NGCs that are more mechanized or processing focused place less importance 
on reputation than do NGCs that have more of a marketing focus. "Competitors' prices" 
is rated as most important by Group 7, again reflecting the position of many Group 7 
NGCs in a high volume/low margin industry. Those in Group 8 agreed that competitors' 
prices were most important; this may reflect the broad-thinking competitive scope of the 
producer alliance NGCs. 
Managerial 
Adrian and Green conducted a survey of cooperative managers, and found them 
to be knowledgeable within several key areas. In this category, Figure 8 shows that 
"managers with knowledge of industry", "experienced managers", and "full-time general 
manager" are first, second, and third most important by arithmetic mean. However, 
ANOVA shows that they are not significantly different, though the first of those three 
factors received the highest number of responses rating it most important in the category. 
"Continuity of management" was rated as the fourth most important in the category, and 
"ongoing managerial training" was the least important. 
No significant differences in LS means were found for the factors in this category, 
but inspection of Table 3 reveals some trends across all groups. Since the survey was 
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filled out mostly by NGC managers, it is interesting to see how they rate the factors most 
closely associated with their own duties. For instance, five of the nine groups rated 
"managers with industry knowledge" as the most important factor in the category, but 
none rated "continuity of management" the highest on average. Also, every group except 
for Group 7 rated "ongoing managerial training" as the least important factor in the 
category, and for Group 7 it was the second least important. This may be because 
manager knowledge is commodity and/or technology specific. Additional training may 
only be required as new commodities or technologies are included in the NGC's business. 
Strategic 
Respondents rated "business strategy" and "product focus" first and second most 
important in this category according to simple mean, but ANOVA shows that the two 
were not rated statistically differently, although the former was rated as most important 
by a higher percentage ofNGCs (Figure 9). This suggests that these enterprises are 
aware of the importance of strategic planning. Both of those factors were rated higher 
than "ongoing planning/checking" and "multiple-market sales", which were tied for third 
and were not significantly different. The former had a higher mean ranking, but the latter 
was rated most important by more overall respondents. The least important factor in the 
category was found to be "enforce member agreements", indicating that NGCs did not 
encounter many difficulties in that area. This is because patronage dividends are based 
on deliveries to the cooperative, so it is in members' best interests to adhere to their 
agreements. 
No significant differences between the LS means of the various groups were 
found. Nevertheless, there was consistency in the mean rankings among groups. For 
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instance, eight of the nine groups rated "enforce member agreements" as the least 
important factor in the category, echoing the results shown in Figure 9. "Product focus" 
was rated most important on average by more groups than "business strategy", even 
though the latter was chosen most important by more individual NGCs. This confirms 
the idea that the two factors were virtually tied for the distinction of being most important 
in the "Strategic" category. 
Planning and Development 
"Local champion(s) or leader(s)" was clearly rated most important in that 
category, being ranked as such by more than half the respondents (Figure 10). ANOVA 
found no significant difference between "steering committee" and "feasibility study", 
which were second and third, respectively, in terms of simple means. Both of those were 
rated statistically lower than "local champion(s) or leader(s)" and higher than the fourth 
and fifth ranked factors, "alliance/partnership"and "proximity to other successful co-
ops", respectively. 
Significant differences between any of the LS means for the different groups were 
not found. However, it is interesting to note that "proximity to successful co-ops" was 
rated least important or tied 'for least important for each of the nine groups. This 
indicates that NGCs do not believe an important factor to success is locating close to 
other successful cooperatives, even though they may serve as inspiration for producers to 
join the new venture. It is also intriguing that "alliance/partnership" was rated second 
lowest or tied for second lowest by all of the groups. Since NGCs are the result of 
cooperative behavior on the part of producers, it is odd that alliances or partnerships with 
existing co-ops are not important to them. 
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Category Ratings 
The distribution of responses for the ten overall categories is shown in Figures 11 
and 12. "Planning and Development", with a mean of 3. 7, was rated the most important 
of all categories, followed closely by "Financing and Costs" with a mean of 3 .8. The 
third most important was "Managerial" (mean 4.0), and then "Operational" (4.7) at 
fourth, fifth was "Strategic" (5.7), sixth was "Product Related" (5.8), "Industry" (6.1) was 
seventh, "Human Resource/Organizational" (6.5) was eighth, ninth was "Logistics" (7.0), 
and "Government/Regulatory Environment" was rated the least most important overall 
category, with a mean ranking of7.0. 
Table 3 shows the mean ratings for each of the 10 categories for all 9 groups, and 
illustrates that there were some statistical differences between the LS mean rankings of 
some of the categories. For instance, the "Product Related" category was ranked 
significantly less important for Group 1 NGCs than for Group 6 or 8. For Group 6, this is 
not unexpected since the those in that group have products that are perishable, and 
product quality is easily discemable to consumers. NGCs in Group 1, on the other hand, 
are largely ethanol producers whose product is homogenous in terms of quality. A 
similar situation exists for Group 4 (though the LS means were not significantly 
different); quality is not a major distinguishing characteristic of the output oilseed 
processors produce. 
Significant differences were also found for the LS means of Group 1 (which rated 
it sixth most important) versus Group 6 (which rated it tied for least important) for the 
"Government/Regulatory Environment" category. This is largely due to the importance · 
of the "demand enhanced by regulation" factor to Group 1 NGCs, for reasons previously 
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outlined. NGCs in Group 6, by contrast, are involved in production of consumer-ready 
foodstuffs, and may consider government regulation of their industry excessive. Groups 
3, 5, 7, and 8 also rated this category as least important of the ten, and no group had it 
rated higher than sixth overall. 
There was a relatively even split of categories receiving the highest ranking from 
respondents. "Planning and Development" and "Financing and Costs" were each ranked 
the highest by three groups ( one ranking for the latter category was a tie). "Managerial" 
and "Product Related" were the most important for two groups each. That the latter was 
ranked highest for two groups is interesting given that it was only ranked sixth overall by 
all respondents combined. This reflects the fact that it was not ranked highly by NGCs in 
Group 1, which was the largest group and thus had the most influence on the overall 
responses shown in Figures 11 and 12. 
Weighted Overall Factor Rankings 
Individual factor rankings for each factor for each NGC can be calculated by 
weighting the within-category factor rank by the overall category rank. For example, the 
factor rated highest by an NGC in its highest rated category is accordingly the most 
important of the 50 total factors. Similarly, the factor rated the lowest in the lowest rated 
category is the least important of all the factors to an NGC. When aggregated over all 
respondents, or even all NGCs in a group, such a weighting should allow direct rankings 
of factors across various categories. 
This calculation was carried out for each factor for each respondent, and then 
averaged over all respondents. This yielded a mean weighted rating for each factor; the 
factors were then ranked from most to least important by lowest average weighted rating. 
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The same calculation can be carried out for factors within individual groups. The overall 
factor rankings and weighted mean ranks are presented from most to least important in 
Table 4, and the results by group are shown in Table 5. 
"Local champion(s) or leader(s)" was ranked as the most important success factor 
across all NGCs. It was ranked highest of the 50 factors by two of the nine groups, and 
was in the top five for four more groups. "Low operating costs" was ranked second most 
important, and was also ranked highest by two of nine groups, with an additional two 
groups placing it in the top five. Third was "steering committee", which did not receive 
the highest rankings from any groups, but was in the top five for four groups and in the 
top ten for an additional four. The fourth most important factor was "member capital 
base", ranked in the top five by three groups and in the top ten by another five. Rounding 
out the top five was the "feasibility study" factor, ranked most important overall by one 
group, in the top five by two more, and in the top ten by another two groups. 
Eight of the ten highest ranking factors came from three categories. The 
importance of "Planning and Development" category was evident in the overall weighted 
factor rankings, with three of the five most important factors coming from that category. 
The "Financing and Costs" category, which contained the other two factors ranked in the 
top five, was also confirmed as important to NGCs. Three of the five factors ranked six 
through ten came from the "Managerial" category, including "managers with knowledge 
of industry", which was ranked sixth overall, "experienced managers, ranked eighth, and 
"full-time general manager", coming in at tenth. "Product quality", a factor from the 
"Product Related" category, came in at seventh most important. At ninth was "strong 
selling/marketing effort" from the "Operational" category. 
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The least important factor across all NGCs was found to be "geographical 
member dispersion" from the "Logistics" category. That factor was ranked among the 
five least important by seven of the nine groups. "Government planning 
support/technical assistance" from the "Government/Regulatory Environment" category 
was the second least important overall, and was ranked in the five least important factors 
by five of nine groups. The NGCs' apparent lack of enthusiasm for government 
involvement is made clear by this result: even though respondents ranked the "Planning 
and Development" category as the highest, merely adding the word 'government' to 
'planning' was sufficient for the factor to be rated among the lowest. The third least 
important factor was identified as "demand enhanced by regulation", also from the 
"Government/Regulatory Environment" category. That factor was ranked among the five 
least important by six groups. "Use of outside experts" from "Human 
Resource/Organizational" came in at fourth least important, and was ranked in the five 
least important factor by four groups. The fifth least important factor for NGCs was 
found to be "enforce member agreements" from the "Strategic" category. Three groups 
rated that factor as among their five least important. 
Corn Processing/Ethanol/Energy 
For Group 1, the largest group with fourteen NGCs, the five most important 
factors were "local champion(s) or leader(s)", "strong selling/marketing effort", "full-
time general manager", and a tie between "feasibility study" and "member capital base". 
That the first and fourth most important factors ( and the fifth highest ranked is also 
related to this category) both are in the "Planning and Development" category reflects the 
importance of planning to that type ofNGC. The other two factors in the top five 
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illustrate the importance that com processing NGCs place on daily operations. Given the 
mechanization, labor force requirements, and large capitalization of those types of 
facilities, these results are not surprising. 
Nor is it surprising that "product uniqueness" and "brand recognition" from the 
"Product Related" category are ranked as the least and fourth least important factors to 
Group 1 NGCs, given the homogeneous nature of their output. Third and fifth least 
important were "communication with members" and "use of outside experts", both from 
the "Human Resource/Organizational" category, and fourth was "geographical member 
dispersion" from "Logistics". 
Livestock 
Group 2 was comprised of six livestock NGCs, who rated "local champion(s) or 
leader(s)", "product quality", "multiple-market sales", "experienced managers", and 
"reputation" as first to fifth overall most important factors, respectively. Merlo asserts 
that the beef industry's reputation as a whole has suffered from its inability to produce a 
consistent, convenient product that is as affordable as chicken or pork. This may help 
explain the selection of "product quality" and "reputation" as being among Group 2' s 
most important success factors. Interestingly, no two of the top five factors for Group 2 
came from the same category. It is noteworthy that "multiple-market sales", the third 
most important factor to Livestock NGCs, was rated no higher than twenty-first by any 
other group. This is because this type of enterprise sells different cuts of meat into 
different markets. For beef processors, for example, there are distinct markets for 
primals, sub-primals, trimmings, hides, bones and offal/renderings. It is more difficult to 
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sell round and chuck than cuts from the loin and rib. For this reason, that factor is of 
considerable importance to livestock NGCs. 
The least important factor for NGCs in Group 2 was "demand enhanced by 
regulation", followed by "geographical member dispersion", "proximity to customers", 
"government planning/technical support", and "site selection". That three factors in the 
"Logistics" category and two in the "Government/Regulatory Environment" category 
were ranked among the five least important for this group is telling: this type ofNGC 
does not rely heavily on distributional factors or the actions of policy makers in its 
operations. This trend may be changing as the newest Group 2 NGCs are developing, 
however: Campbell (2002) notes that 40% of the dollars of the USDA's new value-added 
grants program were awarded to livestock ventures. This may mean that newer livestock 
NGCs are becoming more receptive to government planning aid than in the past. 
Poultry/Eggs 
Though there were only three respondents in Group 3, their factor rankings are 
informative. "Managers with industry knowledge" was ranked as the most important 
overall factors for these NGCs, followed by "experienced managers" and "business 
strategy", which were tied for second. The fourth most important factor was "low 
operating costs", and fifth place was a tie between "steering committee" and "reputation". 
Two factors from the "Managerial" category were in the top five, showing the importance 
of effective management to Group 3 NGCs. Moser (2000) notes that these factors are 
critical to poultry NGCs because of the importance of previous managers' experience in 
product development and sales. "Business strategy" was ranked considerably higher for 
this group than for any other (second overall, versus thirteenth for Group 1), showing the 
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relative importance of that factor and the importance of the "Strategic" category NGCs in 
that group. 
Two of the five factors rated least important for Group 3 NGCs came from the 
"Government/Regulatory Environment" category ("government planning/technical 
support" was tied for lowest, and "demand enhanced by regulation" was third lowest), 
and another two were in the "Product Related" category ("brand recognition" and 
"product uniqueness" at fourth and fifth least important, respectively). "Geographical 
member dispersion" was tied for lowest ranked. None of these rankings was noticeably 
out of line with the rankings assigned by other groups, but they do echo the results for 
other groups of low importance placed on government involvement. 
Oilseed Processors 
Two NGCs made up Group 4, and their rankings of"feasibility study", "steering 
committee", and "local champion(s) or leader(s)" as first, second, and third highest 
overall revealed the considerable importance they place on the "Planning and 
Development" category. "Experienced managers" was ranked as fourth most important, 
and "member capital base", which also relates closely to the development stages for 
NGCs, was fifth. These results reflect that fact that most NGCs in this group are 
relatively new, and the planning and development stages are still fresh in their minds. 
Moser (1999) discusses the importance of these factors for developing an oilseed 
processing NGC. The results further reveal the importance of members' ability to fund a 
processing facility with considerable start-up capital requirements. 
Least important to Group 4 NGCs was the "brand recognition" factor, followed 
by "demand enhanced by regulation", and "product uniqueness". The first and third of 
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those factors are from the "Product Related" category, again showing that producers of a 
product slightly removed from the consumer do not consider those types of factors 
relatively as important. The fourth and fifth lowest ranked factors, "vertical integration" 
and "targeted customer base", are both in the "Operational" category. 
Wheat Processors 
The NGCs in Group 5 ranked "quality oflabor force", "product quality", 
"steering committee", "market size" as the first through fourth most important factors. 
There was a tie for fifth between "product focus" and "feasibility study". High rankings 
for the first, third, and fourth of those factors reflect the fact that Group 5 NGCs are 
involved in a highly competitive output market (Boland and Barton), and must focus on 
high volumes and quality products to succeed. That two of the factors are from the 
"Planning and Development" category again shows the importance of the early stages of 
NGC development to overall success. 
The least important factor to NGCs in Group 5 was "geographical member 
dispersion", echoing a common theme among groups. Notably, the next four least 
important factors all came from the "Government/Regulatory Environment" category: 
they were "government planning/technical support", "demand enhanced by regulation", 
"co-op existence laws", and "direct government agency funding". This reflects the 
overall low ranking of that category by NGCs in yet another group, although "co-op tax 
advantages (i.e. 521 tax status)" was ranked as the fourteenth most important overall. 
Table Vegetables/Organic/Seafood 
The ten enterprises in Group 6 are unique among NGCs because they sometimes 
do not require large member capital infusions to fund processing facilities. Rather, they 
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focus on the marketing of specialized and usually perishable products. NGCs in this 
group considered factors in the "Product Related" category to be of primary importance, 
ranking "customer service", "product quality", and "product uniqueness" as the first, 
second, and fourth most important overall. This is not surprising since organic NGCs 
have arisen as a result of the food quality concerns of consumers (Karg 2000). "Local 
champion(s) or leader(s)" was the third highest ranked factor for these NGCs, and "low 
operating costs" was ranked fifth. Both of these factors were also ranked among the most 
important by NGCs in several other groups. This shows that although Group 6 NGCs 
place unique importance on product related factors, they do have several important 
factors in common with other groups. 
The two least important factors to NGCs in Group 6, "government 
planning/technical support" and "demand enhanced by regulation", both came from the 
"Government/Regulatory Environment" category, matching the overall trend across 
groups. Third least important was "enforce member agreements". It is not surprising that 
this type ofNGC does not consider that factor to be very important, since not having a 
large production facility means that capacity usage considerations are not important, and 
as such, a committed volume of raw inputs by members is not as critical. The fourth least 
important factor was "economic climate". In a rich economy such as that of the U.S., it is 
unlikely that the state of the economy has a significant effect on food consumption 
patterns. "Use of outside experts" was fifth least important to Group 6 NGCs. 
Coffee/Sugar/Table Nuts 
Products for the one coffee NGC, two sugar NGCs, and one table nut NGC in this 
category are unique in that they are processed, similar to those in Groups 1, 4, and 5, yet 
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they are also consumer-ready, similar to the products of Groups 3 and 6. The first and 
fourth most important factors for this group were "low operating costs" and "low 
financing costs" from the "Financing and Costs" category. "Business volume" and "local 
champion(s) or leader(s)" were tied for second most important for Group 7, with "product 
quality" identified as the fifth most important. These rankings reflect these NGCs' 
positions in industries that are moderately competitive with large sales volumes and 
medium scale processing facilities. Control of costs was clearly designated as an 
important concern to NGCs in Group 7. This is not surprising, given pervasive low sugar 
prices. Recently American Crystal, the oldest NGC in the United States, was forced to 
forfeit sugar to the government for the first time in twenty years (Karg 2001). 
Interestingly, the "Product Related" category, which contained the fifth most 
important factor for Group 7 ("product quality"), also contained factor ranked second 
least important, "product uniqueness". This may indicate that although these NGCs feel 
that they must provide a high quality product to be successful, to some extent their 
products cannot be distinguished from competitors' based on unique characteristics. "Use 
of outside experts" was ranked as least important overall. Two factors from the 
"Strategic" category were ranked third and fourth least important; they were "enforce 
member agreements" and "multiple market sales". This indicates that members of those 
NGCs are not troublesome when it comes to fulfilling delivery requirements, and that 
selling multiple products is not a concern for NGCs in this group. Fifth least important 




The two producer alliances included in Group 8 are unique types of respondents. 
Typically, interested producers must be a member of a producer alliance to invest in an 
alliance's NGC. The alliance looks for a potential NGC idea, acquires feasibility study 
funds, finds interested producers to invest, and sets up the enterprise. The alliance then 
allows the management team to take over the operation, and focuses on its next project. 
Respondents in this group therefore can be expected to have a broader focus than a single 
commodity, though the commodities with which they are most familiar will influence 
their overall factor rankings. 
The Group 8 NGCs chose four factors from the "Product Related" categories 
among their five most important overall. "Brand recognition" was ranked the highest, 
followed by a tie between "product quality" and "customer service". Tied for fifth was 
"product uniqueness" from that category with "managers with industry knowledge" from 
the "Managerial" category. It is noteworthy that the product related factors are rated so 
highly by those who are in the business of setting up NGCs. This might mean that a 
product focus is important in the conceptual stages of an NGC, but as the idea comes to 
fruition and begins operation, other factors soon become the focus. 
"Demand enhanced by regulation" and "government planning/technical support" 
were tied for the lowest ranking by the producer alliances, again showing the low 
importance given to the "Government/Regulatory Environment" category overall. Tied 
for third least important were "site selection" and "geographical member dispersion", 
both in the "Logistics" category. This shows that in the earliest stages, factors that might 
be of concern to managers of an operating enterprise are not very important to those 
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responsible for planning. The fifth least important factor was "enforce member 
agreements". Commitment by producers has typically been a big problem for marketing 
cooperatives, but with the large initial investment made by investors in NGCs, it is 
becoming less so. Strong brands usually result in strong commitments by producers 
because they make benefits more tangible. Note, again, that Group 8 NGCs rated "brand 
recognition" as the most important factor. 
Other (Alfalfa, Forestry, Cotton, Anonymous) 
The NGCs in Group 9 came from the alfalfa, forestry, and cotton industries, with 
one anonymous response. With such a heterogeneous group, it is difficult to interpret 
overall rankings. Nevertheless, three of the four NGCs in that group are involved in 
production and/or processing of raw commodities, so they are similar in that regard. 
"Low operating costs" was ranked as the most important, followed by "managers with 
industry knowledge" and then two factors from the "Planning and Development" 
category, "steering committee" and "local champion(s) or leader(s)". This is more 
evidence of the overall importance of the factors in that category. The fifth most 
important factor was "member capital base", which is not surprising since the alfalfa and 
forestry NGCs are in their early stages. 
The least important factor to Group 9 NGCs was "brand recognition", which is 
not surprising given that none of the three identifiable NGCs markets under a name 
brand. "Economic climate" was the second least important factor, next was "use of 
outside experts", and then two factors from the "Logistics" category, "geographical 
member dispersion" and "site selection". The low ranking of factors in that category may 
reflect the fact that bulky commodities are processed into products that are not 
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logistically difficult to get to purchasers. Further evidence in favor of that hypothesis is 
the fact that "proximity to inputs", ranked twenty-seventh, was eight positions higher 
than the next most important factor in the category. 
Summary and Conclusions 
New Generation Cooperatives are becoming increasingly more common as 
agricultural producers strive to increase their share of the value produced by their 
commodities. NGCs, distinguishable from traditional cooperatives by limited delivery 
rights and restricted membership, often require large initial investments on the part of 
members. These enterprises retain the important cooperative principles of one-
member/one vote (although some states allow flexibility in this area) and dividends based 
on patronage, but are more akin to investor-owned firms than their traditional 
counterparts. As such, the factors influencing success for NGCs may not be exactly the 
same as for those on either end of the ownership philosophy spectrum. 
This paper detailed the results of a survey of NGC managers regarding the factors 
most important to NGC success. Factors in the survey were placed in ten broad 
categories, and were included on the basis of a review of business and cooperative 
literature, and on the basis of consultations with extension personnel. Respondents were 
asked to rate the five factors in each category from I to 5, using each rating only once, for 
the most to least important. Of the 67 unique NGCs identified from the Illinois Institute 
for Rural Affairs' "Directory of New Generation Cooperatives", discussion with 
extension personnel, and an internet search, 50 returned usable surveys, yielding a 75% 
response rate. The respondents were grouped into nine categories based on similar 
commodities or activities. 
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Several sets of results were presented. Figures 1 through 12 illustrated the overall 
number of "l" through "5" responses as well as the mean and median ratings for each 
factor for the 50 respondents. Table 2 showed the within-category p-values for the null 
hypothesis of equal mean ratings of factors. Table 3 broke down the mean ratings by 
factor for each of the nine groups, and showed which least-squares means were found to 
be significantly different across groups. 
The product of the within-category factor rating and the overall category rating 
can be used to rank the factors for each respondent, each group, and overall. Table 4 
showed the overall factors rated from 1 to 50 across all respondents, and Table 5 further 
broke down the overall factor rankings by group. Several interesting differences in factor 
rankings across groups were noted, and it was clear that factor rankings depended on the 
specific commodity in question. Groups whose NGCs produce goods closer to the final 
consumer and with a lower degree of processing and product homogeneity tended to rank 
different factors more highly than did groups whose NGCs are engaged in industries with 
more processing and more product homogeneity. 
In general, factors in the "Planning and Development" category and the 
"Financing and Costs" category were revealed to be most important. Conversely, factors 
in the "Government/Regulatory Environment" and "Logistics" were often among the 
lowest ranked. Other categories, such as "Product Related" and "Strategic" had factors 
which were ranked highly by some groups but not as highly by others. As such, it seems 
clear that some factors are important to the success of almost all NGCs, others are 
important to almost none, and, as expected, the importance of some other factors depends 
on the type ofNGC being studied. 
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These results should aid in the development of new NGCs and the operation of 
existing ones. Examples ofNGCs that have failed due to poor planning or operation 
abound. Cognizance of the factors which are important to a particular type ofNGC 
should help raise the success rate for NGCs, and thus enhance opportunities for producers 
to capture more of the value that is added to their commodities. NGCs can make 
important contributions to agricultural producers and to rural areas, keeping people and 
money from relocating elsewhere. It is in helping accomplish that goal that the results 
presented here are most important. 
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Notes 
1. Torgerson (2001b) notes that as many as 75-100 NGCs may currently exist. Many of 
them are in the formative stages. 
2. Of the 72 NGCs identified as potential respondents, a few were no longer in existence. 
In a few other cases, more than one identified potential respondent represented the same 
NGC. The number of unique potential responses was thus lowered to 67, and 50 usable 
responses were returned. Two unique unusable responses were not included in the 
calculation of the response rates. 
3. 521 tax status exempts co-ops from corporate income tax if certain provisions are met. 
109 
References 
Adrian, J.L., and T.W. Green. "Agricultural Cooperative Managers and the Business 
Environment." Journal of Agribusiness 19(2001):17-33. 
Allen, G. "Team Talk." Rural Cooperatives 65(3)(1998):22-24. 
Boland, M., and D. Barton. "Finding a Niche." Rural Cooperatives 68.4(2001):4-8. 
Campbell, D. "Hang on to the ranch." Rural Cooperatives 68(3) (2001):14-22. 
Campbell, D. "Hard times breed new livestock co-ops." Rural Cooperatives 69(1) 
(2002):18. 
Cook, M.L. "The Future of U.S. Agricultural Cooperatives: A Neo-Institutional 
Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(1995):1153-59. 
Cooper, R.G. "The Dimensions oflndustrial New Product Success and Failure." Journal 
of Marketing 43(1979):93-103. 
Gehrke, B., and J. Matson. "Planning to prosper: recalling lessons learned from livestock 
slaughter and meat packing co-ops." Rural Cooperatives 66(4)(1999):24-27. 
Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs. Directory of New Generation Cooperatives, September 
1999. 
Karg, P.J. "New model, old ways." Rural Cooperatives 67(1)(2000):15-20. 
Karg, P.J. "Sweet & Sour: Sugar cooperatives restructure to combat foreign threats, low 
prices." Rural Cooperatives 68(1)(2001):10-14. 
Kraenzle, C.A., ands D.E. Cummins. "Improving their worth." Rural Cooperatives 
66(3)(1999):4-7. 
Merlo, C. "A Co-op for the Cowboys." Rural Cooperatives 65(1)(1998):2-9. 
Moser, L. "Saving an Industry." Rural Cooperatives 67(3)(2000):4-6. 
llO 
Moser, L. "Thumbs up." Rural Cooperatives 66(6)(1999):20-29. 
SAS Institute Inc. SAS I ETS User's Guide, Version 8. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc., 
1999. 
Stephanson, B., M. Fulton, and A. Harris. New Generation.Cooperatives: Rebuilding 
Rural Economies. Center for the Study of Co-operatives, University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, 1995. 
Torgerson, R. "Research key to expanding co-9p knowledge and understanding." Rural 
Cooperatives 68(2)(2001a):2. 
Torgerson, R.E. "A critical look at new-generation cooperatives." Rural Cooperatives 
68(2)(2001 b ): 15-19. 
Trechter, D., and R.P. King. "Building commitment." Rural Cooperatives 69(2) 
(2002):24-27. 
United States Department of Agriculture. The Impact of New Generation Cooperatives on 
Their Communities. USDA Rural Business Cooperative Service, Research Report 
177, 2000. 
Wadsworth, J.J. "Are you a good leader?" Rural Cooperatives 67(6)(2000):20-24. 
Wadsworth, J. "Keep the co-op candle burning." Rural Cooperatives 68(2)(2001):19-20. 
111 
Table 1. Groupings ofNGC Survey Respondents 
Group Respondents Activity/Commodity 
1 14 Com Processing/Ethanol/Energy 
2 6 Livestock 
3 3 Poultry /Eggs 
4 2 Oilseed Processors 
5 5 Wheat Processors 
6 10 Ta~le Vegetables/Organic/Seafood 
7 4 Coffee/Sugar/Table Nuts 
8 2 Producer Alliances 




Table 2. p-values of Tests for Significant Differences in Mean Factor Ratings Within 
Factor Categories (H0: means are equal) 
In-Group Product H.R./ Gov't/ Financing Logistics 
Factor Related Org. Regulatory & Costs 
Comparison 
1-2 <0.01 <0.01 0.52 0.69 0.01 
1-3 0.08 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 0.66 
1-4 <0.01 <0.01 0.38 <0.01 0.18 
1-5 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
2-3 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
2-4 <0.01 <0.01 0.80 0.04 0.17 
2-5 <0.01 0.09 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
3-4 <0.01 0.43 <0.01 <0.01 0.04 
3-5 0.76 <0.01 0.26 0.65 <0.01 
4-5 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.01 <0.01 
In-Group Operational Industry Managerial Strategic Planning/ 
Factor Development 
Comparison 
1-2 0.53 <0.01 0.82 <0.01 0.03 
1-3 <0.01 0.62 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
1-4 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.74 <0.01 
1-5 0.39 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
2-3 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.33 
2-4 <0.01 0.51 0.22 <0.01 <0.01 
2-5 0.82 0.67 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
3-4 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
3-5 <0.01 0.03 <0.01 0.82 <0.01 
4-5 <0.01 0.82 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
Group 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Product Related 
product 3.9 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.3 2.1 4.3 3.5 2.0 
uniqueness (6) (1,7) (6) 
product 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.3 2.5 2.3 
quality 
technology 2.6 5.0 3.3 2.0 3.8 4.9 3.8 5.0 3.0 
incorporated (2,6) (1,4) (2,6) (1,4) 
customer 2.8 2.3 2.0 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.7 
service 
brand 4.0 3.0 4.3 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 1.5 5.0 
recognition (9) (8) 
Human Resource/Organizational 
quality of 1.8 2.8 1.7 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.5 
labor force 
use of outside 3.9 2.3 4.7 4.5 3.5 4.6 5.0 3.0 4.5 
experts (6,7) (2) (2) 
communication 2.6 3.5 2.0 2.0 3.3 2.6 2.0 2.0 2.8 
within co-op 
communication 2.9 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 
with board 
communication 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.3 2.6 2.8 4.0 3.3 
with members 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
( continued) 
Group 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Government/Regulatory Environment 
co-op 3.0 1.5 2.3 1.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 1.0 3.0 
existence laws 
co-op tax 2.7 3.2 2.0 2.5 1.3 2.1 4.3 2.0 3.0 
advantages (7) (5) 
demand enhanced 2.7 4.2 3.7 5.0 3.5 3.9 3.0 4.5 4.0 
by regulation 
direct gov't 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.3 3.0 2.0 
agency funding 
gov't planning/ 2.4 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.3 3.9 2.3 4.5 3.0 
tech. support 
Financing and Costs 
input price 3.5 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.3 
stability 
output price 3.4 2.8 4.7 5.0 3.5 3.9 4.3 2.5 3.5 
stability 
low operating 2.4 2.5 1.7 1.5 2.3 2.3 1.0 3.0 2.8 
costs 
low financing 3.5 3.3 2.0 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.5 5.0 2.8 
costs 
member 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.6 3.5 1.0 2.8 
capital base 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
( continued) 
Group 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Logistics 
site 2.4 3.2 1.3 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 4.5 3.5 
selection 
proximity 1.8 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.3 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 
to inputs 
proximity 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.5 1.5 2.4 3.0 1.5 3.3 
to customers (5,6) (1) (1) 
transport./ dist. 2.4 2.7 2.3 1.5 2.8 3.2 2.3 1.5 2.5 
infrastructure 
geog. member 4.6 3.7 5.0 5.0 4.8 2.9 3.8 4.5 3.8 
dispersion 
Operational 
business 2.4 4.0 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 1.8 3.0 2.8 
volume 
risk 2.5 2.5 3.0 1.5 2.8 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.0 
management 
vertical 4.6 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.3 4.4 4.0 5.0 5.0 
integration . 
strong selling/ 1.8 2.2 3.0 3.5 2.3 1.9 2.8 1.5 2.5 
mktg. effort 
targeted 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 1.7 3.0 2.0 2.8 
customer base (6) (6) (1,5) 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
( continued) 
Group 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Industry 
reputation 2.8 1.3 1.3 3.0 5.0 2.1 3.3 3.0 1.8 
(5) (5) (2,3 ,6,9) ( 5) (5) 
economic 2.8 3.3 2.3 2.0 3.8 3.6 4.0 4.5 4.8 
climate 
market 2.4 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.5 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 
size 
number of 3.4 3.3 4.0 3.5 2.0 3.1 3.5 3.0 2.5 
competitors 
competitors' 3.6 3.7 4.7 4.5 2.8 3.2 1.8 1.5 2.5 
pnces 
Managerial 
full-time 2.3 2.2 3.0 3.5 2.0 3.1 2.5 3.5 2.5 
gen. manager 
experienced 2.6 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.5 3.1 2.8 3.5 2.3 
managers 
continuity of 3.6 3.0 3.7 3.5 3.5 2.6 4.3 2.0 4.3 
management 
managers with 2.6 3.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.0 1.3 
ind. knowledge 
ongoing mgr. 4.0 4.8 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.1 3.5 5.0 4.8 
training 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
(continued) 
Group 
Factor I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strategic 
product 2.6 2.5 3.7 3.0 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.3 
focus 
enforce member 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.0 5.0 3.3 
agreements 
ongoing 2.7 3.7 3.0 1.5 3.5 3.6 2.8 3.5 2.3 
planning/checking 
business 2.1 2.3 1.0 3.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 1.5 3.3 
strategy 
multiple 3.6 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 4.0 3.0 3.7 
market sales 
Planning and Development 
local champion(s) 1.8 1.2 2.3 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.7 
or leader( s) 
steering 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.8 2.5 1.3 
committee 
feasibility 2.4 3.2 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 
study 
alliance/ 3.8 3.7 4.3 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.5 4.3 
partnership 
proximity to other 4.6 4.5 4.7 5.0 4.4 4.5 3.8 5.0 4.7 
successful co-ops 
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Table 3. Mean Responses and Significant Mean Differences, by Factor by Group 
( continued) 
Group 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Overall Category Rankings 
product 8.0 4.2 7.7 9.0 4.5 2.9 6.3 1.0 6.0 
related (6,8) (1) (1) 
gov 't/regulatory 5.3 7.5 9.7 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.5 10.0 4.8 
environment (6) (1) 
logistics 6.6 8.0 7;7 4.5 8.0 6.3 6.5 9.0 7.3 
planning and 3.8 3.2 4.0 1.5 5.5 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.5 
development 
managerial 4.1 4.5 2.3 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.3 3.5 3.5 
human resource/ 7.8 6.2 4.7 6.0 4.8 6.1 8.5 5.0 6.0 
organizational 
financing 4.4 4.7 3.3 4.5 5.0 2.9 3.0 4.0 2.3 
and costs 
operational 4.4 5.8 5.3 8.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 6.0 4.5 
industry 5.6 6.2 5.7 3.5 4.8 7.7 6.0 6.5 6.8 
strategic 5.1 4.8 4.7 5.5 5.3 7.2 7.0 6.5 3.0 
Note: numbers in parentheses are those groups which have different least-squares means 
at the 10% significance level. 
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Table 4. Overall Factor Rankings and Weighted Mean Ranks 
Rank WMR Factor Group 
1 7.2 local champion(s) or leader(s) Planning and Development 
2 8.3 low operating costs Financing and Costs 
3 8.6 steering committee Planning and Development 
4 8.7 member capital base Financing and Costs 
5 9.2 feasibility study Planning and Development 
6 9.2 managers with knowledge of industry Managerial 
7 9.7 product quality Product Related 
8 10.4 experienced managers Managerial 
9 10.8 strong selling/marketing effort Operational 
10 11.2 full-time general manager Managerial 
11 12.0 product focus Strategic 
12 12.5 low financing costs Financing and Costs 
13 12.9 continuity of management Managerial 
14 13.2 risk management Operational 
15 13.5 business strategy Strategic 
16 13.6 business volume Operational 
17 13.7 output price stability Financing and Costs 
18 14.0 quality of labor force HR/Organizational 
19 14.2 alliance/partnership Strategic 
20 14.2 input price stability Financing and Costs 
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Table 4. Overall Factor Rankings and Weighted Mean Ranks (continued) 
Rank WMR Factor Group 
21 14.2 reputation Industry 
22 14.3 customer service Product Related 
23 14.4 targeted customer base Operational 
24 15.8 co-op existence laws Government/Regulatory 
25 15.9 proximity to inputs Logistics 
26 16.3 proximity to other successful co-ops Planning and Development 
27 16.8 communication within co-op HR/Organizational 
28 16.8 market size Industry 
29 16.8 multiple market sales Strategic 
30 17.1 co-op tax advantages Government/Regulatory 
31 17.3 ongoing managerial training Managerial 
32 17.7 ongoing planning/checking Strategic 
33 18.3 transportation/distribution infrastructure Logistics 
34 18.4 communication with board HR/Organizational 
35 18.6 technology incorporated Product Related 
36 19.1 vertical integration Operational 
37 19.3 number of competitors Industry 
38 19.4 direct government agency funding Government/Regulatory 
39 19.9 competitors' prices Industry 
40 20.0 site selection Logistics 
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Table 4. Overall Factor Ratings and Weighted Mean Ranks (continued) 
Rank WMR Factor 
41 20.2 product uniqueness 
42 21.0 proximity to customers 
43 21.1 economic climate 
44 22.1 brand recognition 
45 22.9 communication with members 
46 24.1 enforce member agreements 
47 26.2 use of outside experts 
48 26.5 demand enhanced by regulation 
49 27.9 government planning support/ 
technical assistance 












Note: WMR is "weighted mean rank", the average over all respondents of the category 
rank weighted by the factor rank. 
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Table 5. Weighted Mean Ratings by Factor by Group 
Group 
Factor Overall 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Product Related 
product 41 50 18 46 48 19 4 49 4 32 
uniqueness 
product 7 19 2 16 14 2 2 5 2 38 
quality 
technology 35 38 37 44 32 29 20 39 7 41 
incorporated 
customer 22 43 9 24 41 24 1 15 2 39 
service 
brand 44 47 10 47 50 30 16 42 1 50 
recognition 
Human Resource/Organizational 
quality of 18 26 32 10 6 1 18 38 32 26 
labor force 
use of outside 4 7 46 22 38 40 30 46 50 39 48 
experts 
commun. 27 39 35 13 19 27 26 28 10 21 
within co-op 
commun. 34 41 25 20 31 17 37 44 18 17 
with board 
commun. 45 48 42 31 43 38 29 41 29 37 
with members 
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Table 5. Weighted Mean Ratings by Factor by Group (continued) 
Group 
Factor Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Government/Regulatory Environment 
co-op 24 20 14 40 13 47 34 7 15 40 
existence laws 
co-op tax 30 16 45 35 36 14 35 44 35 34 
advantages 
regulatory 48 34 50 48 49 48 49 37 49 43 
enh. demand 
direct gov't 38 17 30 45 41 46 45 26 44 22 
agency funding 
gov't plan/ 49 44 47 49 45 49 50 13 49 36 
tech. support 
Financing and Costs 
input price 20 26 34 22 31 37 13 19 24 9 
stability 
output price 17 24 16 26 37 35 14 22 13 12 
stability 
low operating 2 6 11 4 13 13 5 1 22 1 
costs 
low financing .12 30 26 7 23 26 8 4 35 6 
costs 
member 4 4 7 7 5 15 10 7 6 5 
capital base 
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Table 5. Weighted Mean Ratings by Factor by Group (continued) 
Group 
Factor Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Logistics 
site 40 25 46 14 19 41 39 33 47 46 
selection 
proximity 25 14 27 39 17 45 17 36 42 27 
to inputs 
proximity 42 45 48 41 26 16 25 32 24 44 
to customers 
transport./ dist. 3 3 33 41 36 8 42 38 24 24 35 
infrastructure 
geog. member 50 49 49 49 37 50 41 46 47 47 
dispersion 
Operational 
business 16 7 44 22 34 28 19 2 28 17 
volume 
risk 14 9 21 31 22 10 28 20 40 10 
management 
vertical 36 37 28 28 47 24 31 24 44 42 
integration 
strong selling/ 9 2 24 24 43 12 7 12 12 15 
mktg. effort 
targeted 23 31 29 26 46 34 6 10 27 19 
customer base 
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Table 5. Weighted Mean Ratings by Factor by Group (continued) 
Group 
Factor Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Industry 
reputation 21 23 5 5 18 43 24 30 35 15 
economic 43 29 32 28 8 30 47 43 43 49 
climate 
market 28 22 36 18 10 4 40 26 34 45 
size 
number of 37 35 40 41 19 11 42 40 33 30 
competitors 
competitors' 39 40 43 43 26 22 43 16 15 33 
pnces 
Managerial 
full-time 10 3 15 11 25 7 26 10 18 10 
gen. manager 
experienced 8 12 4 2 4 7 22 16 20 8 
managers 
continuity of 13 21 16 11 23 20 15 29 10 25 
management 
mgrs. with 6 10 20 1 10 7 11 7 4 2 
ind. knowledge 
ongoing mgr. 31 28 37 15 35 33 33 31 30 31 
training 
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Table 5. Weighted Mean Ratings by Factor by Group (continued) 
Group 
Factor Overall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strategic 
product 11 10 11 31 30 5 21 18 20 7 
focus 
enforce mbr. 46 42 37 37 39 43 48 48 46 29 
agreements 
ongomg 32 15 30 19 13 38 44 35 41 13 
planning/checking 
business 15 13 19 2 29 18 32 34 15 20 
strategy 
multiple 29 36 3 21 26 20 36 47 35 24 
market sales 
Planning and Development 
local champ. 1 1 1 16 3 23 3 2 8 4 
or leader 
steering 3 8 7 5 2 3 9 6 13 3 
committee 
feasibility 5 4 6 7 1 5 11 14 22 14 
study 
alliance/ 19 18 13 31 6 40 23 20 9 22 
partnership 
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brand recognition 4 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Responses in the 'Product Related' Category 
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labor force quality 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Responses in the 'Human Resource/Organizational' 
Category 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Responses in the 'Industry' Category 
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Figure 9. Distribution of Responses in the 'Strategic' Category 
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local champion 25 12 
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Figure 10. Distribution of Responses in the 'Planning and Development' Category 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Responses for First Five Overall Category Rankings 
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Operational 4 3 0 
N=49 Mean=4. 7 Median=4 
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Managerial 7 
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Figure 12. Distribution of Responses for Second Five Overall Category Rankings 
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Appendix A 
Value-Added Cooperative Questionnaire 
Please rank the factors listed in the following categories in order of importance to the 
success of your cooperative .. Each category contains five factors. The most important 
factor in a category should receive a "l" in the available space, the second most 
important a "2", and so on, with the least important factor receiving a "5". Please rank all 
factors in each category. 
Please rank the following factors with respect to their importance to the success of a 
cooperative. 
Product Related (give most important factor a "1 ", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
_product uniqueness: product has unique characteristic(s) for satisfying customer 
needs 
_product quality: the ability of the product to function properly and consistently 
_technology incorporated: level of technological sophistication in production/ 
processmg 
_customer service: working with customers in the use of products after selling and 
ensuring problems are corrected if the product does not function correctly 
_brand recognition: the co-op's product is branded, or tied to a branded product 
Human Resource/Organizational (give most important factor a "l ", second most a "2", 
and so on ... ) 
_quality of labor force: ability of employees to do their jobs properly and consistently 
_use of outside experts: bringing in outside help or consultants when a task cannot be 
done in-house 
_communication within co-op: communication between and among co-op managers 
and employees 
_communication with board: communication between the co-op managers and board 
of directors 
_communication with members: communication between managers/directors and the 
co-op's members 
Government/Regulatory Environment (give most important factor a "1 ", second most a 
"2", and so on ... ) 
_co-op existence laws: laws that allow members to act collectively; ie Capper-
Volstead Act. These laws exempt co-ops from falling under antitrust rules such as the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
_co-op tax advantages (ie 521 tax status): "521 status" exempts co-ops from 
corporate tax if certain requirements are met 
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_demand enhanced by regulation: government regulation creates a demand for the 
product; for example, for environmental reasons 
_direct government agency funding: grants or loans are available from government 
agencies, or a state/federal subsidy is received by the co-op (not a producer 
payment/ subsidy) 
_government planning support/technical assistance: government assistance, in the 
form of funding or manpower, is available for the planning of the co-op or conducting 
a feasibility study 
Financing and Costs (give most important factor a "l", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
_input price stability: limited variation in prices of needed inputs/commodities 
output price stability: limited variation in prices of products produced/sold 
low operating costs (not financing): running the co-op's operations at a minimum 
cost 
low financing costs: ability to obtain financing at low interest rates 
_member capital base: members have sufficient initial equity, requiring less 
borrowing 
Logistics (give most important factor a "l", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
_site selection: availability of land and adequate utilities 
_proximity to inputs: distance inputs must be transported to be processed 
_proximity to customers: distance outputs must be transported to get to customers 
_transportation/distribution infrastructure: ease of access to adequate roads, rail 
service, etc. 
_geographical member dispersion: how members are "scattered" across one or more 
regions 
Operational (give most important factor a "l", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
_business volume: amount of output that is produced and sold 
_risk management: identification, understanding, and management of various types of 
risk 
vertical integration: purchase by the co-op of another link in the supply chain; for 
instance, purchase of a further processing facility, wholesale, or retail outlet 
strong selling/marketing effort: emphasis placed on sales/marketing of a product 
_targeted customer base: co-op's targeted markets/customers are well-defined 
Industry (give most important factor a "l ", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
reputation: the co-op's reputation for doing business with members and customers 
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_economic climate: such as recessions, interest rates, unemployment rates, exchange 
rates, etc. 
_market size: volume of business done by the co-op; both by the co-op and its 
competitors 
_number of competitors: number of businesses in the co-op's market selling the same 
or a competing product 
_competitors' prices: price charged by co-op's competitors for the same or a 
competing product 
Managerial (give most important factor a "l ", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
full-time general manager: general manager on staff full-time 
_experienced managers: managers have previous managerial experience 
_continuity of management: low turnover rate for managers 
_managers with knowledge of industry: managers have knowledge of the industry 
co-op operates in 
_ongoing managerial training: managers receive periodic updates to their training 
Strategic (give most important factor a "l", second most a "2", and so on ... ) 
_product focus: co-op efforts focus on improving and enhancing product quality 
_enforce member agreements: members' delivery obligations and other 
responsibilities are enforced 
_ongoing planning/checking: co-op does planning & checking of performance on an 
ongoing basis 
business strategy: co-op has an overall business strategy vis-a-vis competitors which 
is adhered to 
_multiple-market sales: selling in more than one geographic market, or selling 
multiple products 
Planning and Development (all of these factors relate to the early planning/development 
stage for a co-op) 
local champion(s) or leader(s): most promotion and legwork was done by local 
champion( s )/leader(s) 
steering committee: early on, a committee of individuals was responsible for 
"keeping things rolling" 
_feasibility study: an initial feasibility study was done to assess the viability of the co-
op 
_alliance/partnership: an alliance or partnership with an existing co-op was entered 
into or planned 
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_proximity to other successful co-ops: a closely located successful co-op was looked 
to as an example 
Please rank these 10 categories with respect to their overall importance to co-op 
success. Assign a "1" to the most important category, "2" to the second and so on 




_Planning and Development 
_Managerial 
_Human Resource/Organizational 




Please fill out the following ( optional). This information will not be released in any 
way. 
Co-op Name (please 
print): ___________________________ _ 
Your Name and Position (please 
print): ___________________________ _ 
Please check one of the following 
_I agree to possible further contact to clarify/follow up any of the responses I have 
given 
_Please do not contact me to clarify/follow up on any of the responses I have given 
Thank you for helping us with your responses! If you have any questions or concerns, 
please contact Jared Carlberg, 308 Agricultural Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078 or call (405) 
744-9969 or email carlbej@okstate.edu 
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